IRAN - pariah no more? with Mark Dubowitz
Today we sit down in Israel with Mark Dubowitz, who is the CEO of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), at a time that Saudi Arabia is reopening its embassy in Tehran, and Iran's relations appear to be flourishing with Beijing, Moscow and much of the Sunni Arab Middle East. Six months ago, Iran was under enormous pressure. What happened?
In his role as CEO of FDD, a nonpartisan think tank based in Washington, DC, Mark has advised the Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden administrations and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle, and he has testified more than twenty times before the U.S. Congress and foreign legislatures.
A former venture capitalist and technology executive, Mark has a master’s degree in international public policy from Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies.
According to The New York Times, “Mark Dubowitz’s campaign to draw attention to what he saw as the flaws in the Iran nuclear deal has taken its place among the most consequential ever undertaken by a Washington think tank leader.”
According to The Atlantic, “Dubowitz has been helping design and push forward sanctions on Iran…establishing the FDD as D.C.’s ground zero for research and policy recommendations aimed at highlighting and fixing what Dubowitz saw as the flaws in the nuclear agreement.”
Transcript
DISCLAIMER: THIS TRANSCRIPT HAS BEEN CREATED USING AI TECHNOLOGY AND MAY NOT REFLECT 100% ACCURACY.
[00:00:00] The Ayatollah, uh, Khamenei has, for a long time, tried to turn, uh, Tel Aviv into Seoul. Now what I mean by that is if you look in the Korean peninsula and you look at Seoul, Korea today, right? Seoul is like Tel Aviv. It's a vibrant, high tech, dynamic capitalist economy. Uh, to the north sits North Korea.
North Korea's got nuclear weapons, but also has massive conventional Armory right on the, on the border of South Korea. So the idea is surround Israel in every border in order to threaten Tel Aviv, threaten the industrial heartland and the technology heartland of this country. And in doing so, undermine, if not, uh, completely vitiate the idea's military capabilities.
When
I last sat down with today's guest, Iran expert, mark Dubowitz here in [00:01:00] Israel, Iran was on the back foot under enormous pressure domestically. and increasingly a pariah state in the region and internationally. Today, Iran seems to be under a lot less pressure domestically, and its former adversary, Saudi Arabia, is in the midst of reopening its embassy in Tehran, at the same time that Tehran has seemingly new and flourishing relationships with Beijing and Moscow.
So what is actually going on with Iran? At home, in the region, as it relates to Israel? And what is going on with Iran's nuclear program? As I said, we have Mark Dubowitz on. Mark is the CEO of the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, a nonpartisan think tank based in Washington, D. C. He's advised the Bush, Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations and lawmakers on both sides of the aisle.
He's testified more than 20 times before the U. S. Congress and foreign legislatures. He's a former venture capitalist and tech executive. He has a master's degree from [00:02:00] Johns Hopkins University. According to the New York Times, quote, Mark Dubowitz's campaign to draw attention to what he saw as the flaws in the Iranian nuclear deal has taken its place among the most consequential ever undertaken by a Washington think tank leader, close quote.
Is Iran transitioning from pariah status? Is Iran on the march? And what does it mean for Jerusalem, and Washington, and Beijing, and Riyadh, and Moscow? This is Call Me Back.
I'm pleased to welcome back to this podcast my longtime friend, very longtime friend, Mark Dubowitz, CEO of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. We are having this conversation in Israel's capital in Jerusalem, uh, where Mark spends a lot of time. Uh, we've had conversations in Washington, we've had Conversations in Tel Aviv.
Now we're having a conversation in Jerusalem. Mark, thanks for being here. Thanks for having me, Dan. [00:03:00] Um, so there's been a lot happening, uh, in the subject matter area that you are certainly one of the foremost experts on. You're one of the few people I want to, whose brand I want to pick, uh, whenever this, uh, topic is in the news, uh, which is why I'm glad we got a chance to get together, which is Iran.
And I know you've been following events closely. I want to go back to April 6th, just to set up this conversation. Cause on April 6th. Israel is accustomed to rockets flying into southern Israel, the central part of Israel, from the south, from Gaza. But on April 6th, Israel experienced something it had not experienced in a very long time, which is rockets coming in from the north, from Lebanon, from Hezbollah.
And of course, when that happens, given Hezbollah's, uh, effectively a proxy army for Iran, all the speculation begins. Is Tehran making a move? Is this some kind of escalation by [00:04:00] Tehran? So, you've been here, you've been following events, you've been in and out of the country. You obviously follow Iran closely, as I said.
What is, what should we make of what happened on April 6th? Again, April 6th was interesting because, as you said, rockets came from the north. Um, about, over 30 rockets were fired at Israel. But it turns out that, according to the IDF, the rockets were fired by Hamas. Um, which, um, traditionally has been firing rockets at Israel from Gaza.
Yeah. Um, but over recent years, Hamas has set up a significant military presence in southern Lebanon, uh, with Iranian and Hezbollah complicity. And uh, the, a guy named Aruri. who is the deputy leader of Hamas, works for, uh, the chief of Hamas, Haniyeh, has been spending a lot of time traveling between Turkey, where he's based, and southern Lebanon, setting up, uh, Hamas operations and kind of a nerve center involving Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.
So on April 6th, Hamas fired. [00:05:00] rockets into Israel. The IDF responded to those rockets by hitting Hamas targets in southern Lebanon, but made a real point of trying to separate that from Hezbollah. And everybody knows those rockets could not have been fired without Hezbollah's complicity, but the IDF decided they didn't want to get into a full scale escalation with Hezbollah now.
And there's been a lot of reporting. I've been reading this piece by, uh, Amos, uh, Harel from the, from Haaretz, military analyst, journalist, where he talks about all this intelligence now about meetings in Tehran between, I guess, Hania and deputies to Nasrallah of Hezbollah. So it really does have the feel of Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah, like what you're describing, the meetings in Tehran to make a move.
Yeah, and in fact, there were also meetings in Beirut, uh, with the head of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, Quds Force, which is the overseas arm of the Revolutionary Guards, uh, run by a guy named Kani, [00:06:00] who had replaced, uh, Qasem Soleimani, who you remember was killed. Um, by a drone attack by the United States under the Trump administration.
Uh, so this Quds Force chief assembled the head of Hamas, the head of Hezbollah, the head of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Beirut for planning meetings ahead of that rocket fire and has been coordinating these Iran backed terrorist organizations to basically try to surround Israel on, on every border.
So I, we were going to talk about this. Later in the conversation, but I'm just gonna get to it now. Why now? And I know we talked offline about the internal situation in a sense of Disunity, lack of stability, um, low level chaos inside Israel over the last 12, 14 weeks over the debates, protests, uh, some of the, some histrionic rhetoric being flown in all different directions over the government's judicial reform proposals.[00:07:00]
And you were telling me, you thought that. There was this military intelligence report that pointed to countries in the region, in this case especially Iran, smelling weakness. Yeah, I think that's exactly right. So Amman, or Israeli military intelligence, issued a report to the Israeli cabinet, including to the prime minister and the minister of defense, saying that the internal situation in Israel.
was weakening Israeli deterrence and Israel's enemies were seeing an opportunity to take advantage of the discord inside Israel in order to continue what has been a long time plan to escalate against Israel. I mean, one has to remember that the Ayatollah, uh, Khamenei has for a long time tried to turn Uh, Tel Aviv into Seoul.
Now, what I mean by that is if you look in the Korean peninsula and you look at Seoul, Korea today, right, Seoul is like Tel Aviv. It's a vibrant, high tech, dynamic, capitalist economy. Uh, to the north sits North [00:08:00] Korea. North Korea's got nuclear weapons, but also has massive conventional Armory right on the on the border of South Korea and as a result of the ability of the North Koreans at any time to to really just lay waste to Seoul, uh, the South Korean military option against North Korea has Disappeared and I would even argue and I think many experts, uh, U.
S. military experts would agree that the U. S. military option against North Korea has all but disappeared. Well, Khamenei wants to turn Tel Aviv into Seoul. He wants to do the same thing. He wants to surround Israel on every border with massive weaponry, right, with rockets and missiles and particularly precision guided missiles.
Um, he's been very successful in doing that in Lebanon, in Gaza. He's attempted to do that in Syria, though for the past few years, the Israeli Air Force has been striking. Uh, Iranian and, uh, Hezbollah positions inside Syria to try and prevent that from happening on that border. Certainly the Iranians have got a plan and they're executing on [00:09:00] it quite effectively to, uh, to take over the West Bank and to use their terrorist proxies like Hamas and Islamic Jihad to set up yet another front against Israel.
So the idea is surround Israel on every border, use conventional, massive conventional, uh, arsenal in order to threaten. Tel Aviv threatened the industrial heartland of the technology heartland of this country and in doing so undermine, if not completely vitiate, the IDF's military capabilities. So a few weeks ago when Defense Minister Gallant here, uh, gave that, uh, public statement on a Saturday night, urging for pause of the judicial reforms and cited his security concerns as the basis for, this is what he was referring to?
This is what he was referring to. I mean, Gallant just didn't just, you know, pluck that, um, from some file folder. He, uh, he had received a detailed briefing from Israeli military intelligence and not, and, uh, from Mossad and, and others, other, uh, experts within the Israeli [00:10:00] security system. And he was expressing a, a genuine, deep, concern that, uh, what was happening internally within Israel had significantly undermined Israel's deterrence and, uh, Israel's enemies, particularly Iran, were seeing an opportunity to really now escalate against the country.
So when this new government was formed, the whole narrative of this government got overtaken by the debate over judicial reforms. I had Prime Minister Netanyahu on this podcast and he said it on this podcast, he said it elsewhere that One of his priorities was going to be normalization with Saudi Arabia, and that if he could, on behalf of the state of Israel, you know, Normalized relations, it would effectively end the Arab Israeli conflict.
You've been spending a lot of time in Saudi Arabia, uh, you're close to a number of officials over there. I think in the most, just a few days ago, within the last few days, uh, Saudi Arabia has officially reopened its embassy in Tehran. Which is sort of shocking for those of us who've [00:11:00] been observing the, uh, trajectory of Sunni Gulf Iranian relations over the last, uh, number of years and the idea that there's now embassies being reopened between those two countries.
How shocked were you by this, this rapprochement between Saudi and Tehran? I mean, I guess, how, Saudi and Iran, how, how shocked were you? just the, the reopening of diplomatic relations. And then I want to, second question is how surprised or worried are you by China's role in all of it? So we were aware that the Saudis and the Iranians had been speaking, um, for a couple of years.
And every time I was in Riyadh speaking to Saudi officials, I would ask them how the conversation is going with the Iranians. And they'd say, Terribly, you know, we're very far apart. I say that's interesting. So any any potential for a reconciliation? No, no way We're way too far apart So I was I was shocked when it did when it did occur and I was equally shocked that it took Place under the auspices of the [00:12:00] Chinese Um, and I think that is, as much as the White House has been trying to spin it as no big deal, nothing to see here, or, oh, actually this is a good thing because it deescalates conflict in the Middle East, it, this is, this is terrible for U.
S. national security. I mean, it's clear that the, the U. S. has been signaling since the Obama administration a desire to get out of the Middle East, you know, we're pivoting to Asia, we're pivoting out of the Middle East. Yeah. Um, they say, you know, I guess nature abhors a vacuum. I guess Beijing adores a vacuum because Beijing has moved in, in a very, uh, pronounced way, first economically, uh, but increasingly diplomatically and militarily to try and replace the United States as the major domo of geopolitics of the Middle East.
And this was a big win for the Chinese. So it's bad for the United States. It's bad for Israel. Let me just ask you, so you knew that there were conversations going on between the Saudis and the Iranians, but did you and did the U. S. security establishment know that China was midwifing [00:13:00] that, those, those, uh, conversations?
Well, I didn't know, uh, you know, I've seen reports from the, uh, Biden administration and it's, there seems to be some disagreement with the administration about whether they knew or didn't know. Yeah. Sounds like the White House says they knew, but the CIA was sort of surprised to hear that the Chinese had been midwifing this.
So who knows? I think the important point is, is that, you know, the Chinese saw an opportunity, um, they see a Absence of us interest and influence in the region. They saw a Biden administration that right from the time President Biden was campaigning for, for president, he called Mohammad bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia Pariah.
Right. And so for two years you've had, I, uh, really, I would almost describe it as hostile relations between the Biden administration and, uh, and MBS at, by the way, not helped by Senate Democrats like Chris Murphy and Bernie Sanders and others who've piled on. Mm-Hmm. , uh. On [00:14:00] to the, on to the Saudis, and listen, the Saudis deserve criticism for the human rights record, for the murder of Khashoggi.
I mean, there's plenty to criticize, but they've been a long time U. S. strategic ally, and it was entirely predictable that if we decided to treat MBS as a pariah, he would look for great power cover from someone else. And that, obviously, would be the Chinese and the Russians as they've moved into the region.
And is your sense that they view the Saudi Chinese relationship as, you know, we're going to actually pivot? It's their pivot to Asia? It's Saudis pivot to Asia? They'll pivot to China? They'll pivot to Beijing? Or we will deepen ties or, you know, we'll, we'll, um, warm up ties with, with China as a means to reengaging the U.
S. That the U. S. will, Washington will see us re, you know, our, the, the warmth of ties with Beijing and that will make Washington nervous and then we'll bring Washington back to the Middle East. Yeah, I think it's the [00:15:00] latter. I mean, I think, you know, Dan, you, you've successfully, uh, sold companies and, um. And, uh, included, and successfully dated and married a wonderful woman.
Um, so you, you know this approach of, um, looking for different suitors and playing one suitor against another in order to, you know, raise the price for what the company should be sold for or, um, what kind of, uh, woman you end up marrying. So I think MBS is playing exactly the same game. He is saying to the United States, look, there's going to be a price for continued U.
S. Saudi relations. There will be a price to be paid for Saudi Israel normalization, and I'm going to raise the price. And by raising the price, uh, I'm going to be moving towards the Chinese because I have an alternative suitor. Um, China today is the largest investor, foreign investor in Saudi Arabia. It's the largest customer for Saudi Aramco's oil.
And so economically, the two countries have gotten closer and closer together, and as MBS is transforming that country in, um, [00:16:00] furtherance of his, quote, vision 2030, you know, he's looked to Asia, and he's looked to China in particular, to help fund that, uh, that expansion. But, geopolitically, it was clearly a, um, I think, it was real malpractice on the part of the Biden administration and senior staff.
Democrats to sort of throw away a relationship that in the era of great power competition is a vital relationship that we keep. And, uh, do you think this, so you think the Saudis realize that ultimately China is not their solution in terms of a long term relationship? They, they, they want Washington.
They just want To your point, they, they want Washington to pay for the relationship, but ultimately they want Washington. I think, look, I think emotionally they want Washington, you know, when you, uh, talk to, to Saudis, I mean, they'll make a point of saying, you know, their kids went to college in America, they own a second home in America, if anybody in their family gets sick, they're sending them to, you know, Johns Hopkins.
Right. You know, no one's sending them to [00:17:00] hospital in Beijing or college in Beijing, or they're not buying second homes in Shanghai. So I think on an emotional level, the Saudis feel a strong connection to the United States, and that's obviously been informed by A very strong relationship in the post World War II period, but they're also hardcore realists.
And if they see United States, which on a bipartisan basis, really from, you know, Obama to Trump to Biden, there's been continuity of disengagement from the region of disengagement from the region. Then they're going to look for a great power alternative and really China is the only game in town. Now talk to me about, uh, where Syria fits into all of this.
So Saudi is also. Not just Saudi, the Arab League. I mean, it looked at Syria. It looks like it's on path to reenter the Arab League after being banished from it, uh, because of the atrocious human rights, uh, record domestically in Syria, the civil war, use of chemical weapons in Syria. Now going back, what, eight, nine years?
Uh, so [00:18:00] what's Saudi doing in Syria? Well, the Saudis are bringing Assad in from the cold. Uh, and again, as you pointed out, it's not just the Saudis doing that, but the, the entire Arab League, with a few exceptions, wants to welcome, uh, the Assad regime back into, uh, into the Arab League and try to Peel Assad away from the Iranians.
I mean, that's kind of the play. You know, the idea is that the Iranians have their claws on Assad right now. They, with, they, with the Russians, uh, prevented Assad and the regime from falling. They were complicit in, in Assad's, uh, horrendous crackdown during the Syrian civil war. And the Iranians, uh, to a great extent, both economically, politically, militarily, have entrenched themselves in Syria.
And so I think these are Gulf states in particular taking the lead trying to peel away Assad from, uh, from the Iranians. I personally think it's gonna end in tears, uh, for the [00:19:00] Gulf. I don't see that happening. I don't think Assad is stupid enough. Uh, to, uh, to throw his lot in with the Gulf and, and stiff the Iranians who were behind him the whole time.
But, um, it is an indication again that all of these countries are adjusting to a new great power reality in the Middle East, and that great power reality is their assessment, rightly or wrongly. The United States is no longer committed, um, both militarily and economically. To, uh, flexing its muscles here and that, uh, the Chinese are, the Russians are, and they also have to make new accommodations for this reality.
And that's certainly behind the Saudi Iranian. Reconciliation deal, and it's behind the Saudi Syrian reconciliation deal, but one must remember that the early indicator of all this was, was, were not Saudi actions, they were Emirati actions. The Emiratis have been doing this for quite some time. So they had embassy, they had embassy in, in Tehran, Tehran had embassy in, in the UAE.
The Emiratis were saying, oh, don't worry, we can, we [00:20:00] can have these warmer relations with Israel while we have warm relations with Iran. So it was just as like the Emiratis were an early tell on the Abraham Accords. Exactly right. They're an early tell. That's, that's very well described. Uh, yeah, I mean, the Emiratis have been playing all sides, you know, all through the, the height of sanctions against Iran, throughout, uh, significant escalation, uh, between Iran and the United States.
The Emiratis were sort of the, the lung for the Iranian economy. Many Iranian companies were based in, in the Emirates, uh, billions of dollars of Of illicit trade went through the Emirates. So while the Emirates have been a very strong us ally and became a strong Israeli ally. They continue to flirting with Tehran, uh, all through this and they were early to the, uh, bring Assad in from the cold.
We're now seeing increasing, uh, with, with other Arab countries. So, always watch the Emiratis. They're, as you say, an early tell. And do you, uh, Rich [00:21:00] Goldberg, your colleague from FTD, was on this podcast a few weeks ago. And he made the point about, I had him on just after Iran Saudi news, um, was announced.
And he was, he says, yes, it's a worrying sign. Keep in mind, it could easily fall apart. There, there's a long history of tension between Iran and Saudi. And the idea that this is some massive inflection point is, remains to be seen. That, in fact, there are long, there are long simmering tensions that aren't going to go away overnight.
And, um, the, the reality of those tensions could easily overtake any You know, detente moment that we seem to be experiencing right now. Yeah, Rich is exactly right, but, uh, I think the difference now is, is, is China. I think, I think you now have the Iranians essentially committing to the Chinese, um, that they will de escalate tensions with Saudi Arabia, that they will work to wind down the war in Yemen, that they will stop Houthi [00:22:00] attacks against Saudi cities.
Um, that perhaps even they've made commitments to the Chinese on, on their nuclear program, that they won't go to 90 percent and develop weapons. Uh, we'll see. We'll see if that happens. And, and again, this may end in tears for, for the Chinese as well, uh, when the regime in Iran does what it often can't help itself.
do, which is push forward, be aggressive, uh, attack its neighbors and, and try to destabilize the region. But I think it, I think it makes a difference that, that it was China that, uh, was responsible for bringing the Saudis and Iranians together. Um, because I think the, you know, the Iranians may mess around with us, they may mess around with lots of other countries in the world, but they would have to think twice about, uh, screwing Beijing.
You've been working on The Isolation of Iran campaign for years now, 20 years now, 20 years, 20 years, heroic work. Uh, and one area that you were particularly focused [00:23:00] on is making it very difficult for Iran to import weapons of any kind. defensive, offensive capabilities. What I never anticipated is, yes, there was always the, the, the efforts that you and others were working on to, to make it harder and harder for Iran to import weapons.
What I never really anticipated is Iran being a major exporter of weapons. And what we're seeing now is Iran exporting these drones to Russia, which is fighting a war. That matters a lot to America and, um, and oddly given the seeming weakness of Iran, the idea that, that it's, it's exporting to a, a Kind of world class conventional military.
That the military of Russia has to depend on Iranian exports. Um, so in the, uh, and the, uh, also under the category of, were you shocked? Were you shocked by that? A, is that a real. [00:24:00] turn of events, and how worried you would be about it? I wasn't shocked, because the Iranians have been proliferating weapons, uh, throughout the Middle East for, for decades.
I mean, they've been arming Hezbollah and Hamas. But there was always, like, second and third rate operations. The idea that they're arming Russia. Right. So that was, that's surprising. Yeah. I think, I think you, you put your finger on it, which is that this, you know, what we thought was this military superpower.
Right. All of a sudden, depending on a third rate military power for sophisticated drones and, and maybe even missiles is, is surprising. I, I think it, you know, certainly underscores the, um, the ways in which many people may have inflated the capabilities of, of the Russian military. But also maybe a, a, a poignant reminder that Iran's Own military capabilities are much more sophisticated than we would assume, right?
I mean, for, because of sanctions, because they've been unable to acquire sophisticated weaponry from other countries around the world for decades. They've [00:25:00] been pretty adept at creating their own homegrown military industry, um, which has got today the largest ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East and, uh, a very sophisticated drone industry and obviously a nuclear program where they've perfected the fuel cycle and are on the cusp of developing nuclear weapons.
So, you know, one should never, um, One should never minimize Iranian capabilities, technical capabilities, military capabilities, uh, scientific capabilities. They're a sophisticated country with some pretty capable scientists and military engineers, and I think they're demonstrating that. What, uh, by the way, I want to get to the nuclear, where Iran stands in its nuclear program in a moment, but the ballistic missile program, which is such a priority for Iran, as you say, I was just, I was just reading that, you know, on the anniversary of the Iranian revolution, when they do their big displays, the big displays are all about ballistic missiles.
It's like [00:26:00] the centerpiece and symbolism of Iranian success and progress, quote unquote, since the Islamic revolution is the ballistic missile. What's that about? Like, why? Well, I think, I think it's about a few things. First of all, um, I mean, ballistic missiles are capable of, uh, inflicting severe damage. I mean, conventional missiles and certainly a nuclear warhead carrying ballistic missile could do obviously devastating damage.
Uh, so they, they're, they're very potent in their own right. Second is, um, because of sanctions over the years, The Iranians were never able to develop their own air force, so they, their fighter jets are still like old fighter jets that the United States sold to Shah in the 1970s. Wow. That are flying, you know, but basically are being hung together by scotch tape and, uh, and bolts because they've been unable to acquire a sophisticated air force.
By the way, that's changing now. I mean, that, that's where they're [00:27:00] looking to the Russians. For, um, the acquisition of, uh, fighter jets and attack helicopters and sophisticated battle tanks and anything the Russians can spare, uh, in order to expand Iran's conventional military capability to, to match the capability of the proxies that they've developed around the Middle East.
Um, so the ballistic missiles have been a replacement for the Air Force and I think, I think that's certainly been a, a long time priority for the regime. And remember during the Iran Iraq war, I mean, that was a, that was. You know a war not only fought in the trenches, but it was a war fought in the skies By the exchange of of missiles and I think the iranians really developed their security doctrine and and and contingent on domestic missile development beginning in the iran iraq war and And since then, my colleague actually at FDD, Benjamin Talbot, who just put together a really exhaustive monograph on Iran's ballistic missile program.
He knows more about Iran's ballistic missile program than I think anybody in Washington. [00:28:00] And, uh, you know, he tracks the development of it and, and it's, it's very sophisticated, but, you know, much of that early technology was North Korean, uh, Chinese and Russian. And the Iranians took that early technology, uh, built upon that, reverse engineered it, and now have Very sophisticated domestic capabilities.
Okay, so now let's talk about the topic you spend the most time on, which is Iran's nuclear program. What is the current status? Of the program. Well, Iran today is the threshold nuclear weapons power. Um, they have now enriched just shy of, uh, of 90%. They enriched recently to 83.7%. Um, they didn't accumulate any of that enriched uranium, but they certainly demonstrated their capability to easily get to 90%.
So, and just, just for our listeners to explain why that 90% is such is the key. Is the key threshold? Yeah, 90 percent is considered weapon grade uranium. [00:29:00] Um, that's the enriched uranium or the fissile material you need in order to then develop a nuclear warhead, attach it to those ballistic missiles, and now you have, um, a deliverable nuclear warhead.
And, uh, the ability to, obviously, to threaten not only your neighbors, but, uh, eventually the United States. The, um, the program has been leaping forward, um, since Joe Biden was elected. Now, there's a, there's a very, um, pervasive medium narrative that says Donald Trump withdrew from the nuclear agreement, and since Trump's withdrawal, Iran has rushed forward in its nuclear program.
That's actually not true. Um, Iran took a couple of incremental steps. A year after Trump withdrew from the agreement. Then Trump killed Qasem Soleimani. Head of the IRGC, the most important architect of violent chaos in the region on behalf of Iran. Right, he was the commander of the IRGC Quds [00:30:00] Force. Um, Iran's most competent and lethal battlefield commander, and as you say, the architect of Iran's entire regional strategy with Hezbollah and Hamas and Iraqi Shiite militias and, and using these proxies very effectively against, um, Iran's enemies.
So in just on that, so the United States. is involved in, in the killing of Soleimani. And so what effect does that have on the regime? Oh, it, it shakes the regime to its, uh, to its foundations. I mean, at that point, the regime is not clear whether that's it or whether Trump is going to go forward. And, uh, use American military power to take out Iran's nuclear facilities or, or even take out the regime itself.
So they, they stopped their, their nuclear advances for, for many, many months. Then, we're in election season, and Joe Biden makes it very clear that if he's elected president, he's going to abandon the maximum pressure campaign of his predecessor. He's going to move from maximum pressure to maximum [00:31:00] concessions or maximum deference.
And, uh, he's going to take the United States back into the JCPOA. From the time of the election, when Iran knows that Joe Biden is going to be President of the United States, they begin to expand their program significantly. They go to 20 percent enriched uranium. They go to 60 percent enriched uranium.
They, um, produce uranium metal, which is a, a foundational element for a nuclear warhead. Um, they begin installing thousands of advanced centrifuges at their enrichment facilities in Fordeaux, um, and in Natanz, and they massively escalate their program and they bring, they accumulate fissile material and they bring breakout time.
The amount of time it takes to develop one bomb's worth of weapons grade uranium. That's the definition of breakout time. They take breakout time from about 12 months down to less than two weeks. And that's where it is now. And that's where it is now. And, and most of that expansion. occurred since Joe Biden's election.
So [00:32:00] convenient media narrative. This was Trump withdrawing from the agreement. The reality is when you plot the timeline, political timeline against the nuclear timeline, as we have at FDD, we've, we did an extensive report on this. You see very, very clearly that Iran responds to American weakness or perception of American weakness by massively escalating its program.
But when it senses American steel. Right? In the form of, of killing a Soleimani or the flexing of American military muscle, it, it backs down. But for two years now, uh, the desire that by administration to go back into the nuclear deal has sent a signal to Iran that it can escalate without any consequences.
But some in the Israeli security establishment here that I've spoken to, and I know you're in regular contact with, I do at least believe that even, even though the Biden administration was quite energetically trying to get Iran back into the JCPOA, now that that's frozen for the time being, the Biden administration [00:33:00] is very frustrated, not only with the fact that that's frozen and they realize it's frozen and there's nothing they can really do about it, but they're also, as I said earlier, very concerned about Iran's role in the Russia Ukraine war, and so there's actually some alignment between Jerusalem and Washington on what to do about Iran, which one wouldn't have anticipated at the beginning of the Biden administration, given where the Biden administration was in terms of what you're talking about, which is they were so hungry to get back into the deal.
Yeah, I think that's right. I mean, I think the. The gap between, uh, Washington and Jerusalem has narrowed significantly in two years, as, as you pointed out, because of the dawning reality in Washington that the Iranians are not interested in going back to the JCPOA. And, and they're on the wrong side of this other conflict that America cares a lot about.
Correct. America cares about it and Europe cares about it. I mean, you've seen the Europeans finally energetic. Uh, about Iranian aggression and escalation for, for really the first time in a long time. People like Macron, I mean, leaders [00:34:00] you would have never imagined are, are taking a harder line on Iran.
Right, right. I mean, now that the Iranians are helping Putin kill Ukrainians instead of just Israelis, uh, the Europeans have woken up to the dangers of Iran. But I think it's still, I think the concern is that even though there is a sense of, um, perhaps dawning reality in Washington that Iran doesn't want to go back into the deal.
There's still efforts to try and get the Iranians back into a deal, or some kind of deal. And if it's not the JCPOA, then, then maybe it's the JPOA of 2013, right? That was the interim agreement negotiated by now National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and now CIA, CIA Director Bill Burns, who at that time were senior Obama administration officials, who, uh, ran a secret Negotiation with the Iranians through Oman and concluded an interim agreement which was Iran to, uh, take steps to reduce its nuclear expansion in exchange for [00:35:00] some sanctions relief.
I, I think Jake always believed that was a better deal. Then the 2015 deal that, uh, that John Kerry and Wendy Sherman negotiated. And I think that's the deal Jake would like to go back to it. In fact, I think that was the deal that he tried to convince Biden to pursue when Biden took office. But I think Biden was at that time convinced by Blinken and others that they should go back into the JCPOA because that was the agreement that Obama negotiated.
And that was the agreement Trump withdrew from. I think Jake and others in the White House are still trying to pursue this interim agreement. Um, they call it less for less or freeze for freeze. I call it less for more because I think at the end of the day, we're going to get less in terms of Iranian nuclear concessions.
We're going to try to freeze the Iranians at 60%. Uh, enriched, uh, uranium in exchange for what they would call some sanctions relief. But some sanctions relief would amount to significant sanctions relief. The release of billions of dollars from oil, frozen oil accounts, the lack of [00:36:00] enforcement of U. S.
sanctions. And once you really stop enforcing sanctions, the market response to that is to try to get back to business with the Iranians and all of the pressure on the economy. in Tehran is lifted and you breathe oxygen back into that economy. So it's less for more, rather than less for less. So far the Iranians have shown no indication of interest in either, less for less, or less for more, or more for more.
Um, but that may happen any day, I mean, in a, in a Tehran minute, the supreme leader might decide, you know what, I've put down the protests. And I've pursued these, uh, military and strategic partnerships with Russia and China. I'm feeling emboldened. I want to plan for my succession, you know, maybe to his son, who might become the new supreme leader.
And, uh, now is the time to do a interim nuclear deal with the Americans, get billions of dollars to help breathe oxygen back into the economy. And in the meantime, we'll still be able to pursue our nuclear program on a moment's notice. Have they? Successfully put down the [00:37:00] protest, but we, you know, I mean, it's, it's, it's over now six months.
In fact, when you and I last had a conversation, it was the protest had just been getting underway. I think protests like understates, understates it, it's a much bigger deal than just protests. Um, have they successfully cracked down and, and is it behind them? So, yeah, they, I mean, these were massive protests.
These were, this was a significant. uprising, almost a revolution against the regime. Um, a regime today that is hated by 80 percent of its people. The, um, the regime responded brutally killing over 500 people, arresting, um, thousands of people and, uh, and, and torturing and jailing tens of thousands. I think the, um, The regime today believes that these, this uprising has been successfully, uh, repressed but, uh, there's, there's, there's one coming again.
I mean, one, one has to remember, Dan, I know [00:38:00] you know this, but these, these uprisings have been happening with greater frequency and greater intensity than we've seen, right? We saw the 79 revolution that brought to power the Mullahs. Uh, we saw, you know, student revolutions in the 80s and 90s, um, and then we've seen most recently 2017 all the way to 2023 growing protests.
And the protests have been, have been different. They haven't been from just, you know, middle class North Tehranis like in 2009 yelling, where is my vote after the fraudulent reelection of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Now, these protests are from the base of the regime, right? These are the working class, lower class people who are saying, uh, not only where's my vote, but where's my paycheck?
And they're also coming from the women of Iran, who have rebelled against the strictures, particularly the mandatory wearing of hijab. And, you know, it's hard for the regime to kill its daughters and granddaughters. It's easier for them to kill its sons and grandsons. [00:39:00] You mentioned, uh, Earlier, I just want to come back to this, the two week threshold for, for Iran being able to activate a nuclear weapons program.
You talked to a number of Israeli officials, uh, you're following events here closely. I have encountered divide among, within the Israeli security establishment. Is there anything Israel can do, uh, to prevent or, or to expand the two week? Uh, period to some, some much longer, uh, period before you get to threshold, uh, or before you get to an active program.
What, what's your sense of things? Do you think there could be Military action from Israel anytime in the near to medium future or should there's another strong school of thought within the Israeli security establishment, which is we're just going to have to Israel's just gonna have to learn to live with an Iranian nuclear program [00:40:00] because we've we've missed the moment.
So the Israeli and American security establishment distinguishes between breakout time, which is the amount of time it takes to develop. One bomb's worth of weapons grade uranium, which today is two weeks, and, uh, the development of a deployable nuclear weapon, um, i. e. a nuclear warhead. That can then be affixed to a ballistic missile.
With respect to a nuclear warhead, the assessment by, um, Mossad and Amman military intelligence here is that the Iranians have not yet made the decision to develop a warhead. So the Supreme leader Khamenei has not yet instructed his weapon scientists. to now go and develop an active warhead. And that's a position that, uh, the U.
S. intelligence services supports. Once he's made that decision, it will take 18 to 24 months [00:41:00] to develop that warhead. So, the assessment is they have more time. Certainly when we hear this two weeks, two weeks, two weeks, it's not really two weeks. It's, it's two weeks to a period that then is Yeah, it's two weeks to, um, um, the amount of fissile material you need to develop a nuclear weapon.
And then it's, they haven't yet made the decision. Once they make the decision, it's 18 to develop a warhead. However, the reason there's been a lot of focus on breakout time is that it is much more difficult to weaponize uranium in a, uh, enrichment facility. without being detected than it is to develop a warhead.
So you can, it takes at least today in Natanz and Fordow, you've got weapons inspectors there, you've got, um, Israeli intelligence, US intelligence has quote, wired up the place quite significantly. Um, [00:42:00] they have a pretty good sense of if the Iranians move to develop a bomb's worth of fissile material. Uh, now having said that, there may be clandestine enrichment facilities.
Iranians are developing advanced centrifuges at a, at a great pace. You need far fewer advanced centrifuges in order to enrich that bomb's worth of fissile material than you do with the basic centrifuges. So they could have a active clandestine enrichment facility with a few hundred advanced centrifuges that US and Israeli intelligence know nothing about.
But, having said that, if that's not the case, the warhead can be developed in a laboratory, you know, the size of a classroom, and So that's what's scary. That's really scary. Yeah. Israeli intelligence today feels relatively confident Yeah. That they know who all the weapon scientists are Yeah. And that, uh, if Khamenei were to give a, uh, order for those weapon scientists to get to work on the warhead, they would be able to detect that.
Right. Intelligence is not [00:43:00] 100 percent foolproof. And again, it may be that there's a team of weapon scientists they don't know. They may be, they may get a warhead from the Russians, from the North Koreans. I mean, it could come through a variety of channels. So it's, it's a scary assertion. And I think that's why there's always been a focus on the fissile material.
And still, I think there is a focus on the fissile material by the Israelis as. a potential red line for military action. And that, and that gets to the second part of your question. Um, are the Israelis capable of taking out that program? And, uh, there's a lot of disagreement in the Israeli system about that.
I mean, there's people in the system who say, we're absolutely capable, and we can do it, and need to do it, and need to be ready at a moment's notice. There are people in the system who say, you know what, we'd like a couple extra years. To develop our own capabilities to particularly to take out these very hard insights, uh, that are very deep underground and surrounded by rock and cement and.
and require, um, some pretty impressive, uh, [00:44:00] bombs in order to penetrate those, uh, those facilities. We'd like a couple extra years to, to further develop our capabilities. And this debate is, you know, taking place daily within, within Israel. One final question. Uh, exhaustive, well deserved exhaustive news coverage of these intelligence leaks.
A lot of focus right now, right now, on the person who is alleged to have Who he is, why he did it, the world that he inhabits. Um, that for our purposes is, uh, less interesting than what the sum total of these leaks tells you as an analyst. I mean, you're, it's sort of like real time. It's like real time, like the, the Pentagon Papers, if you will, uh, from the Vietnam War, except in real time, what, what jumped out at you?
So I guess a few things that Dan, first of all, the, um, you [00:45:00] know, obviously, I mean, there's, there's been a feeding frenzy in the media about this cause it is very interesting and it is a significant, um, sec, security leak. The, it does suggest to me that if, if a nation state wanted to run a massive disinformation influence operation to undermine U.
S. national security, you know, this is how you do it. Right? So you, you, you dump a bunch of documents, some, um, genuine, some doctored. onto some gaming site, uh, and you let this spread, and the media will cover it, even if it isn't able to confirm the validity of those documents. So, I mean, this is a message to Iran, to China, to Russia, to North Korea, to our adversaries, that, you know, this is a playbook you can follow.
So it's not some 21 year old kid trying to impress his friends on Discord. Uh, this is a playbook for nation states to undermine U. S. national security. Uh, and do so with the, you know, the willing complicity of, of, of an interested media, uh, [00:46:00] that wants to report on that. The second is, um, in terms of Middle East, uh, allies, a couple things jumped out at me.
One, on the, uh, Israeli side. Uh, we learned that the Israeli, um, security establishment, political establishment is being, uh, spied on by the United States, by the NSA. The NSA is using our vast signal intelligence capabilities to, to keep an ear and an eye on what Israeli, uh, leaders and Israeli security officials are saying and doing.
I guess that's nothing new for anybody who's been following these issues for, for many, many years. Um, one of the things that did jump out was, uh, I think it was a CIA reporter. Uh, DNI report that, uh, you know, they're trying to figure out whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is going to bomb Iran, and they've been unable to figure it out.
And I think it's The truth is, I don't think Netanyahu's made up his mind. That's probably why they haven't been able to figure out where he's leaning, even though, you know, rhetorically and publicly he has been speaking for years about his willingness to, um, to use [00:47:00] military force to stop Iran from developing its nuclear capabilities.
But I found something even more interesting, and it had nothing to do with Israel. It actually had to do with Egypt and Turkey. Um, and that there were intelligence reports that the, uh, the Russians were looking to, um, to buy, uh, Egyptian and Turkish weaponry. I was blown away by that. Here's Egypt, the second largest recipient of U.
S. foreign aid, is in discussions with Moscow. Right. And Turkey, a NATO member. Right. In discussions with Moscow, right? And this is not just, you know, running your mill like oil commercial sanctions busting, right? This is doing what Iran's doing. Right. Which is providing sophisticated weaponry. And probably in both cases, it may have been U.
S. weaponry, um, since we are major. Both economic and military partners with, uh, the Egyptians and Turks, uh, to Putin to kill Ukrainians in, in defiance of U. S. sanctions, [00:48:00] European sanctions, and, and certainly, uh, at least a united Western, uh, community. I had less, I mean, I've less, a fewer question marks, a fewer, I, I, I've fewer questions about this as it relates to Turkey, but what I was, I was really struck by Egypt because I was like, how did they think they could pull this off, even if they wanted to do it?
Without the United States knowing about it. Yeah, or, or, I think, Dan, even worse, they probably thought that it would come out, but at the end of the day, It wouldn't matter. As Ayatollah Khomeini once said, the United States can't do a damn thing. And I think it really does underscore something that we've been talking about a theme throughout this entire conversation, which is that when there is a perception, again, rightly or wrongly, that the United States is no longer committed to the Middle East, it creates a power vacuum, and into that vacuum.
Have marched the Chinese and the Russians and as a result the fear of the United States has diminished [00:49:00] And, uh, the fear and respect for China and Russia has increased. And we're seeing our allies taking numerous steps. We've talked about the Saudis, we've talked about the Emiratis, but now this is an example from our Egyptian friends of being willing to defy the United States in some flagrant ways because they don't fear the consequences.
And it reminds me of a, a sort of a comment that, uh, I remember Rob Malley once made. Rob Malley is the current Iran envoy to the U. S. State Department. And, and Rob was, Rob had said, uh, at some point that. You know, leverage was something that we should use only against allies, not against adversaries.
Because if you use it against adversaries, adversaries escalate, but if you use it against allies, I mean, the power of America and our leverage against allies was something that was, um, awe inspiring and we had significant leverage over, um, our allies. Well, it turns out after two years of this administration and an Iran policy being led by Rob Malley, um, our adversaries [00:50:00] Like Iran don't fear us and our allies like Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Egypt don't respect us.
Um, and in a very, again, I'm, this is not political or partisan. I'm, I'm a registered independent and wish the Biden administration great success because great success by the Biden administration is great success for the United States. But I would say that the past two years, certainly in, in, in the Middle East.
Um, have been, uh, have been a failure in many respects, even though I, I admire what, what Joe Biden has done against, against Russia in, uh, in Ukraine. I think the Middle East has been an example of what happens when U. S. power recedes. And in this era of great power competition, we're now seeing what a world dominated by China with its junior partner, Russia, could look like.
All right, Mark. You know. I come to see you, uh, because no one's closer to, uh, these events and, and has more, uh, [00:51:00] has richer analysis of these events than you do, but I always do kind of leave depressed. So, I, I, I, uh, doesn't mean I'm gonna come see you less. But, uh, it doesn't mean I'm going to be cheery and upbeat and skipping out of our meetings.
But thank you for taking the time, stay safe, and I'll see you soon. Thanks, Dan. Appreciate it.
That's our show for today. To keep up with Mark Dubowitz's work, you can follow him on Twitter, at MDubowitz. That's M D U B O W I T Z. You can also follow the work of the Foundation for Defensive Democracies at FDD. org or at FDD on Twitter. Call Me Back is produced by Ilan Benatar. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.