What is Trump’s Iran Strategy? - with Nadav Eyal

In response to escalating tensions with Iran, the US, over the past month, has been quietly — and not so quietly — ramping up its military presence in the region, signaling it’s preparing for the possibility of direct confrontation with Iran. Six B-2 stealth bombers, capable of carrying bunker busting weapons, have been deployed to Diego Garcia, a remote base in the Indian Ocean that's well within striking distance of Iran. At the same time, while missile defense systems have been repositioned to guard against Iranian retaliation, the US Navy has extended the deployment of the Harry Truman carrier strike group and has sent in the USS Carl Vinson, adding serious firepower to the region.

So, to many Israelis, it came as a surprise when President Trump, with Mr. Netanyahu sitting beside him, announced on Monday that the United States would engage in “direct” negotiations with Iran on Saturday, in a last-ditch effort to rein in the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program. So we’re looking at a very volatile situation, with military might being deployed on the one hand, and a diplomacy track underway on the other. How are Israeli decision-makers assessing the situation?

With us today is Call me Back regular Nadav Eyal, senior analyst for Yediot Achronot, to help us unpack how we got here, and what Israelis expect to happen next.

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Full Transcript:

DISCLAIMER: THIS TRANSCRIPT HAS BEEN CREATED USING AI TECHNOLOGY AND MAY NOT REFLECT 100% ACCURACY.

NE:  The US has to deal with crisis with China and Taiwan, with Ukraine and Russia. In all of these cases, the US adversary has nuclear weapons and that gives them a lot of leverage. Now, why would the United States want to grant the Iranians the possibility to have nuclear weapons? Is it reasonable that the US would say it's here that we draw the line. We can’t take away Russia's nuclear weapons. We can’t take away the Chinese nuclear weapons. We probably can't take away North Korean nuclear weapons without risking a nuclear war. But we can actually do this in Iran. And what are they gonna do? 

DS: It is 10:30 AM on Wednesday, April 9th here in New York City. It's 5:30 PM on Wednesday, April 9th in Israel as Israelis wind down their day and begin preparations for the end of the week, the coming Shabbat and the Passover holiday, Pesach. And I highly recommend a conversation I just had in the last episode of Call Me Back with Rachel Goldberg-Polin on thinking about the paradox of the Passover Seder and how to approach it during this year's holiday. And one housekeeping note, as I've mentioned before on this podcast, on Tuesday May 13th, I'll be delivering the State of World Jewry Address and having a conversation at the 92nd Street Y. The venue within the 92nd Street Y has changed to accommodate probably unexpected demand. So if you're interested in registering, please go to the link in our show notes. I think there are still seats available. Now onto our conversation. In response to escalating tensions with Iran, the US over the past month has been quietly or maybe not so quietly actually ramping up its military presence in the region, signaling that it is preparing or possibly preparing for a direct confrontation with Iran. Six B-2 stealth bombers capable of carrying bunker busting weapons have been deployed to Diego Garcia, a remote base in the Indian Ocean that's well within striking distance of Iran. At the same time, while missile defense systems have been repositioned to guard against Iranian retaliation to any strike from the US or Israel, or others, the US Navy has extended the deployment of the Harry Truman carrier Strike Group and has sent in the USS Carl Vincent adding serious firepower to the region. So to many Israelis, and I think to many Americans, it came as a surprise when President Trump sitting with Prime Minister Netanyahu next to him during an Oval Office meeting that was partially open to the press, announced that the United States would engage in direct negotiations with Iran on Saturday. This coming Saturday. In what was characterized as a last ditch effort to reign in the Islamic Republic's nuclear program. Airing these comments publicly in the way that it was done, could be interpreted as signs of daylight between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump on how to go about dealing with Iran, and perhaps a shift in how the US and Israel will work together on this issue, or at least how closely they're coordinating. So we're looking at what could be a very volatile situation with US military might being deployed, on the one hand. On the other hand, diplomacy seems to be well underway, although maybe those are all in sync and all pieces in the same puzzle, focused on one strategy. With us today to help us unpack all of this, especially from Israel's perspective and help us understand what's going on, is Call me Back regular Nadav Eyal, who is a senior analyst with Yedioth Ahronoth. Nadav, thanks for being here. 

NE: Thanks for having me again, Dan.

DS: Nadav, I wanna start with this Oval Office meeting yesterday on which they brought in the press and both the Prime Minister and the President made comments and took questions. How did this meeting come about and then what unfolded? Just describe to us what actually happened when the president and the Prime Minister were making statements and taking questions from the press. 

NE: What really happened is that the president started taking questions and most of the questions came from the American press and they were about tariffs. And if you watch the YouTube video of this entire exchange, you see how the American press is so focused on the US economy and it takes time until they start talking about the issues at hand in the Middle East. And then at a certain point after another question like that, the president really needs to shush the press and really give the signal he has a major announcement to make, and the Prime Minister is sitting next to him, and then he says that the US and Iran are having direct negotiations as to Iran's nuclear program, and there's gonna be a major meeting on Saturday. And then he elaborates in response to a question that this would be senior level. And there are two huge headlines. And let me tell you, some of the president's staff present in the room were surprised, not because of the news. They were well aware, but because it was made this way by the president next to the Prime Minister and some of the Israeli delegation in the room, and the Israeli journalist in the room, I wasn't there. They didn't think that this is gonna happen the way it actually did, or they didn't think that the president would use the word direct negotiations with Iran. At any rate, the Prime Minister was surprised. Israel was surprised, and I published a week ago that two Israeli high ranking sources are telling me that the negotiations between the US and Iran are already in the making. So for the Israelis, they knew that because of intelligence, because of other sources, maybe because the Americans told them that this is gonna happen. And we know for a while that this conversation about a possibility of talks in Oman, indirect conversations between the Americans and the Iranians. This might happen before any decision made by the United States and that the United States is gonna give a chance for the possibility of getting a deal. So I think the main surprise was that this was the headline to be taken from the meeting with the Prime Minister, that the announcement for it would be made with the Prime Minister on his side. Definitely not something that the Israelis like to hear too much, but they do understand that this is part of the process and that the administration needs to go through this phase of trying to get the Iranian nuclear program somehow stopped and uprooted through diplomatic means before any other means would be considered. And I need to say that then the president in response to a question by Barack Ravid also said that if they won't agree to some sort of an understanding as to their nuclear program, Iran would be in great danger. I'm quoting that is the phrase he was using. And that is something that Israel is holding onto. The fact that a military strike is very much on the table and that the Iranians are there and are pressured as far as the international community is concerned. And this is not just negotiations that can drag on forever. The Prime Minister, when he came back to Israel on his way. He made the point that this can't drag on, and he made that point mainly, Dan, because he understood that there's a deadline here, and the deadline is the snapback sanctions, which we can talk about if you want.

DS: Why don't you explain why there's this looming deadline for some kind of action to be taken? 

NE: The looming deadline is because of the deadline for the snapback UN sanctions against Iran. This mechanism was decided during the JCPOA, the previous agreement, and the basis is that every party to the agreement can make these sanctions reappear just by saying that the Iranians are not answering the demands of the international community. So it doesn't need clearance from the other signatories of the JCPOA, and this is the power of the snapback mechanism, and the deadline is October 18. That actually to get this done, you would need many, many more months ahead. Some countries argue that the US doesn't have this right because we drew from the JCPOA. President Trump has said that the US does have that, and as far as the Americans are concerned, they do, but you do need to convince the Europeans and other elements to abide by these sanctions. And this is the reason why there's a pressure of time here as far as the sides are concerned that the Americans and the Israelis are concerned in negotiating with Iranians. 

DS: Okay. From Israel's perspective, if Israel was ever going to take military action against Iran, assuming there weren't these negotiations, if Israel was gonna take military action against Iran to completely, permanently cripple, if not totally comprehensively shut down Iran's nuclear program. It seems to me now would be the best time for the following reasons. One, Iran's air defense capabilities have been, if not totally wiped out, largely eviscerated because of military action that Israel has taken against Iran since October 2nd. B, Iran's proxies that Israel and Israeli decision makers always lived in fear of in terms of their capacity to respond to any action Israel takes against Iran have also been wiped out. Most notably Hezbollah, that you always would hear Israeli players within Israeli security systems say one of the deterrents against Israel taking action against Iran was that Iran could just flip a switch and unleash hundreds of thousands of Hezbollah fighters and rockets and missiles. And so that, from Israel's North, and that's gone. C, Israel has never had one could argue an administration, it is working more closely with that has its back, is sending its weapons capabilities and defense capabilities on a seemingly unconditional basis as it has with the Trump administration. And D, if Israel is ever to take military action against Iran, there is always this factor of what will be the international backlash and will Israel be isolated internationally if it takes action against Iran. And as some Israeli officials have pointed out to me, given what Israel has experienced since October 7th in terms of international backlash and isolation and excoriation, give me a break. What else you got? Is this all you have? If this is what we're supposed to be afraid of, we've just gone through the worst of it and we're still standing. We're surviving. In fact, we're thriving. So, the international backlash is not a deterrent. Iran's proxies are not a deterrent. Iran's defense capabilities are not a concern, and we have an administration that we are completely synced up with in a way that we haven't had in a long time other than perhaps the first Trump administration. So now is the time to go. What is your response to that? 

NE: This is indeed the Israeli argument made in Washington DC. Let me elaborate a bit about the difference between an American strike and an Israeli strike, and I think this is extremely meaningful. What changed, what shifted is that the Israelis are now saying we can do this effectively and we can do this in coordination with the United States, and we can do this alone. Including its stockpiles, its centrifuges, and the components that allow the Iranians, or might allow the Iranians to actually assemble a nuclear weapon. Now, this is new. In the past, Israel, always, even 10 years ago, you probably remember one specific summer in which Netanyahu was prime Minister and Ehud Barak was the defense minister, and Israel considered a preemptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. And then it rejected that in cabinet, and what the Israelis are telling the Americans is, we can do this if you help us with this and that component. One of these elements is fueling jets because it's a long flight path and you need a lot of airplanes in the air. Another element is specific types of ammunition. The bottom line is that the Israeli Air Force and Israeli defense apparatus is saying, we can do this alone. We would rather that the United States would do this, and we believe that you could be, of course, you Americans could be much more effective. We also think as you, you made the case very clearly and eloquently, Dan, that this is the right time to act. There would be no better window of opportunity. They are the weakest that they have been. If you do this now, you might not only lead to the nuclear program severely damaged, but also maybe to a change or a shift in the Iranian approach. I don't wanna say in the Iranian regime, but close to that. So now is the time. But if the United States doesn't want to, from its own reasons, give us that basic type of assistance and we will go at it alone. Now, this is very different than Israeli positions in the past. Another thing changed, which was reported at the time, a big headline during the war. And that is that the Iranians have started exploring the possibility of assembling a nuclear weapon in less sophisticated way than they were aiming to, let's say two decades ago. Think about this as the difference between a handheld gun or having a sniper rifle. They were aiming for a sniper rifle that they can miniaturize and put in a ballistic missile and shoot. This is the highest capacity that a nuclear power can have. Having this kind of a warhead that you can put on a ballistic missile. Now what they're aiming for, according to US intelligence, this was published in the New York Times back in February. They are aiming for a much more primitive design of a nuclear weapon. Something that resembles more of the bombs that the US built during the Manhattan Project. Now, why would they want to do that? Because the problem is always delivery. Well, the answer is they can detonate it and become immediately a nuclear power. They can pull a North Korea on us. And that is what the US is worried about. The US intelligence is worried about, Israel is worried about, because it's a touch and go. They do that and then what happens? Then you have here a certain elements that are drivers. You have the snapback sanctions that are gonna expire. You have the sense that they are weak and it's a window of opportunity and the pressure of the Israelis to act. And you have the Iranians and the Iranians have today more enriched uranium, and they have this intention probably, and they're collaborating because of what you said, Dan, because the wall of fire around Israel crumbled. Their idea of how to deter Israel collapsed. And for the Islamic Republic, now come people to the Supreme leader and they say, your Fatwa, your Islamic decision, that nuclear weapons are illegal according to Islamic law, you need to change that and you need to change that because it's the survival of our country. We have no other tools. And if he goes for it, it can be a very limited period of time until they get that primitive nuclear bomb and possibly detonate it to show the world that they are there. And even if they don't detonate it and we know that they have it, then what happens? Right? So this is the pressure. 

DS: How did Iran respond to President Trump's statements from the Oval Office? 

NE: So interestingly, they confirmed that negotiations are gonna happen in Oman this Saturday. Abbas Aragchi, who's the foreign minister of Iran, said, these are indirect negotiations. The US insisted more of a direct route. The Iranians are saying indirect. It doesn't really matter because the president is sending Steve Witkoff, who's basically, and I'm saying this as a spectator, seems to me like the main senior advisor of the president for anything international or his envoy, I don't wanna say advisor, his envoy. And Witkoff has shown how effective he can be with the hostage negotiations. The relations between the president and Witkoff as far as I'm hearing are ideal. There is absolutely no daylight there. He trusts Witkoff. During the previous Trump administration he didn't have a witkoff there.

DS: No, but he had Jared Kushner. But lemme just say something about that ‘because I think this is relevant to what you're saying. One of the reasons I think Jared was so effective in the last administration is when he traveled around the Middle East, leaders around the Middle East, particularly in the SUNY Gulf, viewed Jared as not only the president's son-in-law, but the president's confidant, trusted advisor. They knew when they were speaking to Jared, they were speaking to Trump, and that is very important all over the world, but it's especially important in the Middle East. It is comparable to, I can't think of an American diplomat that has had that kind of status in modern history. James Baker with George HW Bush had that. Everyone in the Middle East knew that Baker, when you're speaking to Baker, you're speaking to Bush. Not only was he had an official capacity, but he was the president's best friend. And Jared had a comparable relationship. He wasn't the president's best friend. He was a trusted advisor. He was a confidant, he was obviously a member of his family. And I think Witkoff is not Jared, but I think it is well understood now that Witkoff has the president's ear, has the president's confidence so that when you're talking to Witkoff, you're talking to the president.

NE: And he's a prime negotiator. This is what he does with Ukraine. This is what he did with the hostage deed very successfully.

DS: The Russian Ukraine thing isn't over yet. I wouldn't give him the Nobel Peace Prize for that. 

NE: Oh, no, I didn't say that. As to the success, my remark was as to the hostage deal, at least for now.

DS: Okay, got it. I thought you mentioned Russia. 

NE: Yeah, and we just saw another event with Trump and Witkoff and the hostages returning. On the other hand, they're very worried. And the reason that Israel is worried about these negotiations is that they have nightmare scenario, which, I don’t know if that scenario is gonna happen or if it's plausible, but that scenario is that they wake up in the morning and the White House says there is an agreement, and then they look at the agreement and it's something that resembles the JCPOA or even worse than the JCPOA. Then Israel can do nothing. Absolutely nothing. It cannot strike Iran when the White House is vetoing it. It needs to do whatever basically the United States has signed on to. Now, as to how realistic is this scenario? I think it's completely different this time. First of all, because you have in the administration both Marco Rubio and Mike Waltz making the case, and I think this is the position of the administration right now. 

DS: And I would add Pete Hegseth to your list, but keep going. 

NE: And the administration is signaling this and briefing that what they are aiming for is the Libyan model. And the Libyan model is the difference between an arms control agreement in which you control the level of the enriched uranium. You take out some of the enriched uranium, you look at the nuclear installments and the rest, and the Libyan model basically says you go to the infrastructure and you take care of the infrastructure. You take out the infrastructure completely. And Mike Waltz is on the record saying that this is what the United States wants in this case. So if this is the position of the United States is, it's off the table as far as the Iranians are concerned. If it comes to that and the Supreme leader needs to make a decision between the Libyan model taking out all its nuclear infrastructure or a strike, he's probably gonna take his chances with a strike. This is, as far as the Israelis are concerned, they're saying the bare minimum that the US can agree to is something that is well beyond the maximum as far as the Iranians are concerned. And because of that, the assessment, at least in Israel, is that this is gonna blow up unless the nightmare scenario is gonna happen. And then the Israelis, at any rate, have no tools at their disposal. If the president makes the call that he wants an agreement with Iran and he's, um, you know, allowing Witkoff to have any concessions that the president would want, the Israelis would need to live with that. They're not gonna strike Iran against the backdrop of an agreement signed between the White House and Tehran.

DS: So if you wanted to put the best frame from Israel's perspective on this complicated situation and complicated set of developments, could it be, just to summarize what you're saying here is the US is going to negotiate and in those negotiations it is going to prove to itself and to the world that Iran is not serious about putting a pause or an end to its nuclear program. And therefore both the administration will have exposed to itself and to the world why military action is the only way to solve the problem, regardless of who takes the lead on that military action. So that the negotiations are a short, truncated targeted approach that is a necessary step on the path to military action. That's one way to think about it. Or if somehow they reach some kind of agreement with Iran, the US would only agree to a deal with Iran that, as you say, it's like the Libya model, which is while it's suboptimal that the United States reaches an agreement with Iran, it would only be a deal that is highly favorable in terms of what it means for Iran's nuclear program from Israel's perspective. So either way, Israel comes out a winner as far as its own strategic interests are concerned in these direct talks. I'm not saying, by the way, this is not my view. I'm not saying what I'm saying is accurate, but if you're looking at this from Israel's perspective, from Israeli analysis, the best case scenario for this path is one of those two outcomes. 

NE: Yeah. I think the best case scenario for Israel, and the Israelis are making this case that the US discovers that the Iranians aren't serious, that they're trying to cheat during the negotiations, that they're trying to drag on the negotiations and they're trying to bluff the president. And then the US comes to the conclusion that it needs to strike Iranians nuclear facilities. Now, Dan, here's what the security sources I'm speaking with are saying. They're saying there's gonna be an agreement with Iran, but this agreement needs to happen only after you strike them. Exactly like Hezbollah. They said we're gonna have an agreement with Lebanon, but if we're gonna have an agreement without striking Hezbollah first, it's gonna be a very bad agreement. It's gonna be a bluff. It's the same sources, Dan, that are saying to me, you need to strike them first, the Iranians, then get an agreement with them. And the Israelis want to have an agreement. They just want to have this agreement after a strike. Is this gonna be an American strike or an Israeli strike? They don't know. But if you don't take away their tools to begin with, they'll still think that they have the upper hand. And because of that, this is what the Israelis are pushing for now. Let me give you another calculus, which I find interesting. Look, the US has to deal with crisis with China and Taiwan. With Ukraine and Russia. In all of these cases, the US adversary has nuclear weapons and that gives them a lot of leverage. Whether it's China, Russia or North Korea. There's one place in the world, just one place, one region in that sense, in which only an ally of the United States has nuclear weapons according to foreign sources I have to add as an Israeli, and that is Israel and the Middle East. Now, why would the United States want to grant the Iranians the possibility to have nuclear weapons. Even the capability to develop them, not the weapon itself, which of course every administration is against, but the capability isn't reasonable that the US would say it's here, that we draw the line. We can't take away Russia's nuclear weapons. We can't take away the Chinese nuclear weapons. We probably can't take away the North Korean nuclear weapons without risking a nuclear war. But we can actually do this in Iran. And what are they gonna do? Iran is big on talking. See what happened during this war. As you said earlier, Dan, see what they actually achieved. What are they gonna do if the US is gonna attack now? Against what I just said, there are strong voices within the US administration, within the Trump administration that are saying, no, we need to focus strategically on China. We need to focus on what is important. We don't have endless resources. We need to put our military assets and our attention to the Pacific and to Asia and not to these issues to begin with. And that's a strong element around making that case. And by the way, I can understand the case that they are making. 

DS: Okay. I know that debate about the Trump administration is heated, generally speaking on a variety of fronts as it relates to Israel and Israel's security, I think their record has been really unparalleled. But that being said, if you had to lay out an analysis briefly, 'cause we're gonna wrap here in a moment. A world in which the strategic interests of the US and the strategic interests of Israel were to diverge on this issue. On how to deal with the Iranian nuclear program, how would you analyze that or how would you characterize that divergence? Because there are four powers in the world today that pose a major threat to the US and US interests. China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Three of those four countries currently have a nuclear weapons capability. The fourth, Iran, does not. And it is sitting there right now, the US is staring down the possibility of the fourth power in the world that is actively working against the US suddenly having, waking up one day and finding out that it has a nuclear weapons capability. This fear for Israel has always existed, meaning the fear that Iran, we wake up one day and learn that Iran has nuclear weapons capability. But I just think for the US now seeing what's going on in the world, seeing the volatility in the world, seeing the possibility, the potential for wars to just pop up in different regions. You know, over the last few years, obviously a war in the Middle East, multiple wars in the Middle East, multiple fronts, a war between Russia and Ukraine. Increasing concern about a war between China and Taiwan. And we can go on. For the US you would think these concerns are totally in lockstep with Israel's about the fear of now suddenly Iran being another power that is even a bigger threat than anybody realized. So I understand why the interests are totally aligned, but paint a picture for me where they're not. 

NE: So I remark about this as to strategic priority. If you think that the US has limited resources, and it does, it does have limited resources, although it's the world's greatest military power, even historically, even in relative in absolute terms, it still doesn't have the power to overstretch too much. And there, if you go into this, you don't know how this ends. The Iranians might strike against American targets in the Gulf. They might strike against the Saudi oil industry. You know, Dan, what's gonna happen when someone walks into the Oval Office and says, if you allow the Israelis to do it, not if the US does it, if you allow the Israelis to do this, they might respond against the oil industry across the Gulf and in Saudi Arabia, and this would lead to oil prices rising dramatically, and this would lead to prices in this country spiking dramatically. Why should we do that? Is this really something that we wanna risk? Americans might die in the process. And also, let's keep our eyes on the bull, and this is the most, the simplest argument made within the administration. Let's keep our eyes on the bull. And that bull is China. And there is an overarching idea here made by the president, no more foreign wars. He's sometimes accused by his adversaries that he doesn't keep the same kind of position for a long time. No, this position has been there for decades that America shouldn't be in foreign wars. For the US to attack Iran, this is not gonna be just one strike and done. If the US is gonna do it, they're gonna wanna make sure that they got it right, and that would mean preparing for a conflict across the region. Also, there's a question of effectiveness, and I need to bring this up because I spoke with a former senior Israeli that everyone listening knows his name well, and he told me, look, you cannot be effective in striking the Iranian nuclear program as you think, because you usually calculate this according to the number of centrifuges that you destroy. From their scraps and bits and pieces, they can reassemble. Now after they've been attacked, they'll have some support in the global south, some support with other countries. They'll say that they are the victims of aggression. They're part of the NPT. They didn't withdraw from the NPT. They never said that they're gonna develop nuclear weapons. And then what do you do in three years? You attack again and you drag the world again to that? What's your long-term strategy? So to that, the Israelis are saying the long-term strategy is strike now, offer immediately a carrot later. That's very interesting that the Israelis would say that Dan, the Israeli security establishment is saying yes, you should offer the Iranians carrots. You should offer them a good agreement. You should offer them acceptance into the international arena, but you should do that after you strike. Now, another issue we didn't discuss is that, of course, the main accusation, also levied by myself against the JCPOA was that it didn't include its ballistic missile program. It didn't include its involvement with her. Again, the US administration is saying, as far as I understand, no, this agreement needs to be overreaching as to Iran's activities across the region. They cannot continue on supporting terror groups and all the rest. Now, I don't know what they can actually achieve in negotiations with Uranians.

DS: Final question for you, Nadav. Just trying to tie together a number of threads we've addressed in this conversation. From Prime Minister Netanyahu's perspective, what do you think the prime minister's takeaways were from his meeting with Trump on Tuesday? 

NE: Netanyahu didn't get during that meeting, at least publicly, anything he really wanted beyond the President's support as to Gaza and the President compliments to his leadership. Now, that's a lot because Netanyahu has to deal with Qatar-Gate in Israel, and I think that the Prime Minister is now challenged. He's challenged by these negotiations in Oman, and I think he's also challenged by something the president has said when asked about his vision to Gaza, I'm talking about the voluntary immigration of Palestinians, the president immediately allowed the Prime Minister to answer first, which isn't typical. And when he answered, he talked about that, he said There are other plans as to Gaza, and I think this also is an issue for the Prime Minister as to the Iranian issue that is the subject of this conversation. Netanyahu knows that he can try and influence and give the American's intelligence as to the Iranian intentions. He can try and use his leverage and the connection he has with the president to explain what the Iranians are trying to get. But at the end of the day, it's the decision of the president whether or not he's gonna go for an agreement. What type of an agreement? Immediately when the president said direct conversations, so I was focusing, I was zooming in onto the Prime Minister's face. And I then talked with a senior minister in Israel and he said, looking at the face of the Prime Minister, you could see the computer that is Bibi Netanyahu really computing the chances of everything that's gonna happen and what needs to be said, doesn't need to be said. And he was saying this in a complimentary way because Netanyahu is very talented in these kinds of situations. And one of the things that he got right, I think to his credit as to President Trump is that he should never, ever contradict or be an an open confrontation with the White House. If this is the president, even if he thinks differently. And I, it's amazing how many leaders around the world didn't get that, about President Trump, that even if they strongly disagree, and of course many of them do, you should never make it public or else nothing good is gonna come out of this. So maybe, you know, other countries are bigger than Israel. They have other interests. But Natanyahu gets this about the President and he knows that this is how he influences or can influence the White House. He also knows that unlike other presidents in the past, like President Obama or President Biden, he doesn't have the Republicans in the sense that he knows that the entire party is extremely loyal to the President and it's gonna be the President's call to begin with. He can't play between the Hill and the White House anymore, and that's the challenge for the Israelis right now, looking to the negotiations with Iran. 

DS: Alright, Nadav, we will leave it there. Thank you as always and I look forward to being in touch soon. 

NE: Thanks very much, Dan. Happy Pesach.

DS: Although as Rachel Goldberg-Polin told us today, no wishing anyone a happy Pesach, wishing a meaningful Pesach and um, I’m sure we'll be in touch soon after.

NE: Thanks, Dan.

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