Tom Cotton on the Lab Leak Hypothesis of Covid19
The source of SARS-CoV-2 has been a mystery. One theory that was initially met with a scathing response from many in the media and some in the scientific community was that SARS-CoV-2 might have leaked from a research lab in Wuhan, Hubei in China - the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
The leading voice elevating the need to investigate this possible scenario back in February of 2019 was U.S. Senator Tom Cotton (R-AR). At the time, The New York Times declared Senator Cotton’s remarks a “conspiracy theory.” The Washington Post headlined an article: “Tom Cotton keeps repeating a coronavirus conspiracy theory that was already debunked.” Was it debunked?
Or has more light been shed on it that warrants further examination? That’s where we are today, in which we suddenly find the discussion turning. Some in the press and in the science community - and among a bipartisan set of officials - are exploring this hypothesis.
To be clear, these voices are not giving much credence to the possibility that the leak - even if it came from the Wuhan lab - was some kind of deliberate bioweapon attack. The question is whether well-intentioned research there was accidentally leaked. If it was, why can’t we get to the bottom of it? Might have there been a cover-up of a potentially innocent error? What are the implications if there was, indeed, an accident and then a cover-up?
To help us understand all of this, we are joined today by Senator Tom Cotton. He serves on the Senate Judiciary Committee - where he is the Ranking Member for the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice and Counterterrorism. He is also on the Armed Services Committee and, most importantly for purposes of this issue, he sits on the Senate Intelligence Committee.
Senator Cotton is a graduate of Harvard, and Harvard Law School. He served nearly five years on active duty in the United States Army as an Infantry Officer. In Iraq with the 101st Airborne and in Afghanistan with a Provincial Reconstruction Team. He previously worked at McKinsey & Co.
But before we bring on Senator Cotton, we wanted to provide a short explainer of the facts that we know so far, to inform our conversation with the Senator. To help us, science writer Jim Meigs returns to the Post Corona podcast. Jim is the former editor of Popular Mechanics, where he helped reposition that century-old brand to become a major voice on contemporary tech issues. He currently co-hosts the How Do We Fix It? podcast and is working on a book about man-made disasters. Previously, Jim was executive editor at National Geographic Adventure. He’s the monthly tech columnist for Commentary Magazine and is with the Manhattan Institute, the most important urban policy think tank in the U.S.
Transcript
DISCLAIMER: THIS TRANSCRIPT HAS BEEN CREATED USING AI TECHNOLOGY AND MAY NOT REFLECT 100% ACCURACY.
[00:00:00] Ultimately, this is the responsibility of the Chinese government and there need to be actions taken to make them pay for it. You know, I mentioned my Li Wenling sanctions bill. I also have legislation that would open federal courts, um, to people who've been injured by the virus, which is basically every American, um, to seek redress in the same way that we did for the 9 11 victims.
There are many ways to make China accountable for what they have done to the world over the last Welcome to Post Corona, where we try to understand COVID 19's lasting impact on the economy, culture, and geopolitics. I'm Dan Senor.
The source of the coronavirus pandemic has been a mystery. One theory that was steamrolled with a scathing response from many in the media and many in the science community was that it might have leaked from a research lab in Wuhan. The Wuhan [00:01:00] Institute of Virology. The leading voice in elevating this theory back in February of 2019, which is more of a hypothesis than anything, was U.
S. Senator Tom Cotton. The backlash to Senator Cotton was hot. The New York Times declared his remarks, quote, a conspiracy theory. The Washington Post headlined an article, quote, Tom Cotton keeps repeating a coronavirus conspiracy theory that was already debunked. Close quote. Was it debunked? Or has more light been shed on it, and it now warrants further examination?
That's where we are today, in which we suddenly find the discussion turning. Turning in the press, turning among many in the science community, And also turning with a bipartisan set of voices, elevating the hypothesis and calling for a more serious look at it. To be clear, none of these voices are giving much credence to the idea that the leak, even if it came from the Wuhan lab, [00:02:00] was some kind of deliberate bioweapons attack.
Or that bioweapons were even being developed there that were inadvertently leaked. The question is whether well intentioned research there Was accidentally leaked and if it was why can't we get to the bottom of it? Might there have been a cover up of a potentially innocent error? What are the implications if there was indeed an accident and then a cover up to help us understand all of this?
We are joined today by Senator Tom Cotton Senator Cotton serves on the senate judiciary committee where he's the ranking member for the subcommittee on criminal justice and counterterrorism he's also on the Senate Armed Services Committee, and most importantly for this conversation, the Senate Intelligence Committee.
He's a graduate of Harvard and Harvard Law School. He served nearly five years on active duty in the U. S. Army as an infantry officer. In Iraq, he was with the 101st Airborne. In Afghanistan, he was with a provincial reconstruction team. His military [00:03:00] decorations include the Bronze Star Medal. Combat Infantry Brigade and the Ranger Tab.
Between the Army and the Senate, Tom worked for a number of years for McKinsey and also served in the U. S. House of Representatives. But before we bring on Senator Cotton, we wanted to provide you with a short explainer of the facts that we know so far. To inform our discussion with the Senator, and to help us, we bring back our friend and science writer, Jim Meggs.
Jim is the former editor of Popular Mechanics, where he helped reposition that century old brand to become a major voice on contemporary tech issues. He currently co hosts the How Do We Fix It podcast, and he's working on a book about man made disasters. Previously, Jim was executive editor at National Geographic Adventure.
And he's a monthly columnist for Commentary Magazine, and he's also with the Manhattan Institute, the most important urban policy think tank in the U. S. So here's first our conversation with Jim Meggs to provide us an explainer.[00:04:00]
And I'm pleased to welcome back science journalist Jim Meggs to the conversation. Jim, welcome to Post Corona. Nice to be here again. Yeah, it's great. You have a real following with our audience, so there's no one better to help us. Let's understand this issue or at least get a little more clarity and a little smarter on the issue before we jump into our conversation with Senator Cotton.
So Jim, just to set this up, as we've discussed, there are basically two theories about the origin of, of this coronavirus. One is that it jumped naturally from wildlife to humans. The other is that the virus was under some kind of study in a lab and then. It leaked out, it escaped from the lab, and, and the reason we're trying to get to the bottom of this is because it matters a great deal in terms of preventing this in the future to understand how this happened.
Because according to the Nicholas Wade piece in Medium, he says something like they've examined 80, 000 [00:05:00] Animals? Yeah. In the vicinity of Wuhan and they can't find a single trace? Right, right. You'd think it would be pretty ubiquitous if it was, uh, if it was capable of jumping to people at that rate. So, so that is Very telling.
China has made a really strong effort to point the finger anywhere, but at the lab, that too is a little bit telling. It's not, none of this stuff is proof. And this is a hypothesis that needs to be investigated there. We can't make any conclusions now, but we can start to see the route that investigations should take and to admit that the press in particular, but the scientific community as well, was Was alarmingly not only reluctant to take up this line of questioning, but they really suppressed it and they really ridiculed anybody who was willing to bring up this topic including Senator Cotton very notably.
So in the case of SARS 1 and MERS [00:06:00] viruses, you, there were copious traces in the environment and they found them, I think in one case it was they found it within four months and the other case, They found it in the, uh, in something like nine months. So the fact that we are still now well over a year into this and they haven't found any sources.
And as I said, they examined something like 80, 000 samples. That, that is an important data point. Absolutely. You know, again, it's the absence of, of evidence. So you can't, it's not definitive. Okay. But that's, so that's the negative argument. We're, we're, we're not gaining evidence for the theory that everyone initially thought was most plausible.
Then, then the second track is what is the evidence we have. Okay. So let's. For the lab. Okay. So let's talk about the lab. So the Wuhan Institute of Virology. So can you explain what that place is and why it is at the center of this. The Wuhan Institute of Virology is a really world famous research center.
They're [00:07:00] capable of operating biosafety level four research, which in theory means that that research is all taking place in rooms that use negative pressure. Nothing can get out. And there's only, it's one of only two of. Such labs in the world, right? At that level, I believe, uh, before. Yeah, and and it is The researchers are not only is the room Protected the researchers operate in inflatable suits Everything is is, you know airtight scrubbed down.
It's completely it's supposed to be completely impervious if they are operating at Level four what we found out and the Nicholas Wade piece brought this up. All the people defending the lab kept stressing this bio safety level four. But a lot of the research they do there isn't done at that high level of security.
In fact, some of the research they were doing on on bat viruses was [00:08:00] being conducted at level two, which is You know, not that different from maybe a, you know, a hospital or a dentist's office. I think, I think Dr. Richard Ebright from Rutgers, who's a leading expert on biosafety, has said that it's level two is, is, is the equivalent of the safety and cleanliness of a dentist's office.
So, so now all of a sudden this. This great piece of evidence, so as to explain why this was so, so unlikely, now it looks, it's quite the opposite. If they were operated at biosafety level two, then it was highly likely that a virus, one that we now know is so contagious, could, could jump from mice or in other ways to, um, to humans.
And then once it infects one worker in the lab, then it could easily travel to others and then break out into the community. So what is then the significance of the, of the newly revealed information that a [00:09:00] handful of workers, scientists working at the Wuhan lab had been actually infected with this virus early on?
Well, it might be too soon to say it's a smoking gun, but it sure is starting to look like that because that's exactly the scenario you'd worry about. People are working with this virus. They get infected themselves. We know, we now know that, that, uh, COVID 19 often spreads by people who are. not really symptomatic or pre symptomatic.
They go home, they infect other people. They go to the hospital, they might infect hospital workers. You can easily see how this could lead the breakout in the community. So now we've got another piece of the puzzle. Yes, people did get sick at the lab. We don't know. It was so early. We don't, it's not confirmed that they had COVID 19, but it certainly seems very persuasive.
I mean, the timing is right. The location is right. These pieces are starting to come together. Okay. Okay. So. I want to go now to February 19th of [00:10:00] 2020, just as this issue was starting to get oxygen by Senator Cotton and others, that the Wuhan lab leak may be a scenario we should look at more closely.
There was this strong backlash from certain factions within the scientific community, including a group of virologists who wrote a piece in the Lancet on February 19th saying, quote, We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories. We stand together to strongly condemn conspiracy theories suggesting that COVID 19 does not have a natural origin.
And then they, they said that the, uh, they, all these scientists over, I quote, overwhelmingly conclude that this coronavirus originated in wildlife. Why is this piece so significant at that time? It's really striking for two reasons. One is that it was so unscientific. They were basically [00:11:00] saying, we'd be really surprised if it came from the lab, and therefore it couldn't have come from the lab.
That's exactly the opposite of the way science is supposed to work. Science is supposed to challenge Our biases and to explore alternate explanations and not be too comfortable that just because people are experts, you know, they, they get to define reality. That was, that was one part that was quite striking about the letter was how thinly based it was in, in actual science and, and how it didn't reflect a real scientific methodology.
The second part was the person who organized that letter was a guy named Dr. Peter, uh, Dr. Peter Daszak, who's president of the EcoHealth Alliance, which is a virus research organization, which helped fund some of the research at the Wuhan Laboratory. And he had been an early advocate for gain of function.
Yes. So research, we should explain what the gain of function. Why don't [00:12:00] you do that? Basically, when a virologist have something that's either a pathogen or something they think could turn into a pathogen, say a virus from a bat, they will manipulate in various ways and say, this thing seems like something that could evolve with a few small mutations.
This might get much more dangerous, more contagious. So we'll test out all these viruses. And if they get one that's really dangerous, they'll say, okay, okay. Well, that's really bad. We should look out for it. And conceivably, you could use that, uh, to design, uh, vaccines against viruses that haven't even emerged yet.
So, it, there's a rationale for the research. For a lot of other people, it just sounds crazy. You're, wait, you're, you're, you're taking pathogens and you're making them much more dangerous in the lab just for research? You know, how do you balance the potential benefits and the potential risks of that? If this virus did escape from the Wuhan lab, which is looking more and more likely, then we really, there's going to be a global [00:13:00] reconsideration of this kind of gain of function research.
And there's an interview that Dr. Daszak gave on December 9th of 2019. So before, before the pandemic, the outbreak of the pandemic was generally known. And he gives this, this long interview, making the case for the exact kind of gain of function research that That is being pointed to as the source under the lab leak hypothesis.
He makes this impassioned case. Exactly. Exactly. And, you know, I'm sure he's regretting having given that interview now because he lays out exactly the rationale why the lab would have been doing the work that could have produced this super contagious virus. And obviously there was this long history of viruses escaping from even the best run laboratories, right?
The smallpox virus escaped three times. from labs in England causing numerous deaths and the viruses have leaked out of labs almost every year and you know There were leaks from laboratories of SARS 1 in [00:14:00] Singapore, Taiwan Numerous times so this is this is not a new phenomenon, right? And the thing about the lab, you know, it's it's sort of like what they used to see about defending against a terrorist attack You have to protect you have to protect the public every day The terrorists only have to get lucky once the virus only has to get lucky Once you know, if your lab is handling dangerous things and you an excellent job every single day for years on end, and then one day somebody makes a tiny mistake that that could be enough.
But the other thing about this, this paper, um, that the Lancet paper, the Lancet paper, and that was just one of several things from scientists condemning this, this notion. They use the word conspiracy theory. They took something that, uh, Senator Cotton and others were asking as a question, was there possibly an accidental release of, of a virus?
And they immediately characterized that argument in its most extreme or most [00:15:00] ridiculous fashion. And yet those letters and papers were taken. as gospel by the press who immediately slapped the label debunked on any claim that we should look into the lab leak possibility. And Peter Daszak, again, as we now know, organized the Lancet letter, organized the signatories and the end of the letter concluded, quote, we declare no competing interests, meaning there is no conflict of interest, which we now know no one was.
Uh, on the hook as much, perhaps other than the Chinese government, no one was on the hook as much as Peter Daszak. So, the idea that he didn't have a conflict of interest here is, was ludicrous. Yes, and in fact, to make matters even more complex and, and, and dicey. The, that EcoHealth Alliance received some funding from the US government, uh, partly under the direction of, of Anthony Fauci for various periods.
[00:16:00] And, uh, to do various types of research, Fauci has been hotly denying that they funded the gang of fun, gain of function research at the Wuhan labs. But my reading of it is it's a little, it's, it's not so clear cut. And, and there's some debates about the exact definition of gain of function, but clearly some money from the U.
S. went to, through, uh, EcoHealth Alliance to the lab in Wuhan to be used in bat virus research. So just because, so the funding was Uh, the grants were made by the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which, which Fauci heads, correct, which is a part of the NIH, the National Institutes of Health.
And the grant proposals were through the, through the EcoHealth Alliance, as you said, to fund the work of Dr. Shi Zheng. Li, or she's commonly referred in the, a lot of the scientific literature and also in the political commentary, political reporting, is quote unquote, the bat lady. So why is Dr. [00:17:00] Shi Zhengli the bat lady, and why is she such an essential figure here?
Well, she is the leading, the leading expert on bat viruses in China, perhaps one of the top experts in the world, who has collected samples from thousands of bats in caves all over China. So, If you think about the fact that more of these viruses were probably moving through her part of the laboratory than anywhere else in the world, maybe again, it's not so surprising or so unlikely that if a new virus was to emerge from a lab, from a laboratory, the odds Are pretty high that it would be her laboratory.
We don't know that. We're still there's still a lot of work to be done to confirm this. But but certainly this was this was, you know, the hot zone for research into new Corona viruses, especially ones coming from bats. And what was the significance of the State Department investigation? Visit to the Wuhan lab in 2018.
Yeah, that's really interesting. [00:18:00] There was a visit from some biosecurity experts and they were very alarmed by the conditions at the lab and sent back a memo saying that that the Recommending not cooperating with the lab and they thought that they weren't really properly prepared to do bio Safety level for research as they claim.
So that was a real early warning shot. As you start piecing the evidence together on this lab, you start seeing no one of these things is definitive. But one after another, we start seeing these things line up to suggest that there was a real possibility that the work of that lab was was not being done properly and had strong potential to allow a leak out to the public.
One question about the geography here. So the first cases of COVID 19 occurred in September that we know of when the temperatures in the Hubei [00:19:00] province in Wuhan were already cold enough to send, you know, bats into hibernation. So, so that's one confusing part. And then there's a confusing piece of information.
And the other confusing piece of information is these bats Or these, the various options for, for the origin animals are typically found nowhere near Wuhan, like they're, like all the way in, you know, southern China. Yeah. So can you explain this? So, yeah, so, no, I mean, the idea that, uh, a bat from, from hundreds of miles away in a very, very different climate and ecosystem would affect people in, in Wuhan.
It's a stretch. Initially, when everybody heard about the wet markets, you know, it led to a lot of speculation that people are eating all kinds of weird, raw animals and stuff. And so to Americans who don't necessarily. You know, we're [00:20:00] not experts on this. That sounded really plausible, that some weird thing happened with some kind of animal in the market.
But you could also speculate that, in terms of the lab leak hypothesis, if a bunch of people were getting sick but didn't know it yet, where's a likely place for where they would be interacting and and spreading the virus from one person to another. Maybe a market is, is one of the first places you'd expect to see, see transmission.
And then they spread out through the community. It's not so far fetched. Right. The, the, the two closest known, according to Nate Wade, the two closest known relatives of, of SARS V2 were collected from bats living in caves in, in Yunnan. So that's, that's the province of Southern China. If the virus had infected people living around those caves.
In that southern province that could strongly support the idea that the virus had spilled over to people naturally, but that's not what happened. We didn't find it. Yeah, right. The pandemic broke out 1, 500 kilometers away. Yeah, yeah. [00:21:00] So, so we're not seeing that pattern again that you would see with Ebola and a lot of other diseases where you find a site, a local outbreak site in close proximity or, or with people actually handle these animals.
What you did find was a very compelling case, uh, a couple of years earlier, I think it was 2000 and. 12. I don't have the date in front of me. When a bunch of mine workers who are a bunch of people were cleaning bat guano out of a mine shaft and all came down with a serious respiratory illness. We later learned that, uh, that Dr.
Xi went to that mine and then samples up from that mine were brought back to the Wuhan laboratory. Okay. Well, Jim, thank you for. Um, this quick tutorial, very complicated stuff, I'm, I'm sure this is not the last time we're gonna talk to you about this issue, so we'll have you come on again, but before we jump into our conversation with Senator Cotton, uh, we need a little bit of a crash course here, so thank you.
Oh, it's my pleasure.[00:22:00]
And I'm pleased to welcome Senator Tom Cotton to this conversation. Senator, good to see you. Thanks, Dan. Good to be on with you. You have been at the center of this debate now for well over a year. The issue has become, uh, hot again, or maybe hot for the first time because of the whole issue of the, of the lab leak hypothesis, because of information originally released by the State Department in the last administration, and then later confirmed to some degree by the current administration, and suggests that there's a basis for this hypothesis that should be investigated.
So, Before we get going, what is, like, walk us through the basis for the lab leak hypothesis, both what you were focused on over a year ago and where your head is at on it today. Today, I believe, uh, more firmly than ever that the most likely for the origin of this virus is a leak from the laboratories in Wuhan.
I believe that [00:23:00] really from the very beginning. So now I'll go back to the beginning. You know, it was during the impeachment trial in January of 2020 that I began following closely news of a. Unknown viral pneumonia in central China and Wuhan. Um, that was all public source information. Some of it was obscure, you know, health journals or East Asian English language news sources.
Um, not much of that was coming from my role on the armed services or the intelligence committee. And one thing I took very seriously was the possibility that this had leaked from a laboratory. Again, not based on any super secret intelligence or advanced scientific knowledge. but just common sense. Um, China claimed that this was a coronavirus that had moved from bats to humans or bats to an intermediate host of humans in a food market in Wuhan.
Um, Wuhan is larger than New York City and it [00:24:00] has labs just down the street. That research coronaviruses one of the two Level four labs right in in China if not in the world. Yeah, and it you combine that with the Chinese Duplicity from the very beginning. That's first how I knew that this was Potentially going to be a very deadly pandemic because on the one hand China was saying we have this under control no cause for alarm who you shouldn't declare that it's a Uh, global health emergency.
On the other hand, they were locking down provinces that had more than the combined population of our entire West Coast. Uh, they were welding people shut into their apartment buildings. And they were lying about the wet market. I mean, that was established last January, Dan. Uh, The Lancet, which is not exactly a bastion of right wing journalism, published a study that showed of the first 40 or so, uh, persons known to be infected with the coronavirus, um, almost half of them.
Had no contact with the wet market at all. So that wet market, because of its [00:25:00] conditions, may have acted as an accelerant to spread the virus, but the virus went into that market before it came out of the market. And again, since this is a large metropolitan city with these laboratories far away from any bats that are known to carry coronaviruses, just the inherent logic of the ants in common sense says.
The most likely explanation is a leak from these laboratories. And there, you know, there's some other points that have, have come out from the scientific community since then, is that bats in wet markets, as part of a diet, is not a Wuhan, it's not known for Wuhan, it's a much more phenomenon in, like, southern China.
Yeah, I think that's right. I think subsequent evidence and reporting has suggested that There were not even bats present in that food market, which again, suggests it acted as an accelerant for human to human transmission. It was not, uh, the, um, origin of the virus and that the Chinese communist party conveniently pointed the finger at it as a cover story to something else.
And other coronaviruses have [00:26:00] broken out, but typically in these tropical areas and, you know, and even, even still at that time of year, the bats would have been hibernating. So the idea, just, it was just a lot that you did. All correct. And look, you know, Shijun Li, the scientist who researches bat based coronaviruses had put out a documentary earlier about how they were researching these bats and they were collecting them and bring them back to the Wuhan laboratories.
And he said, you know what, I believe then what I believe now, the evidence is only continued to advance. Now it's all circumstantial evidence. We obviously don't have direct evidence. Intelligence rarely works that way. Um, but for instance, um, after SARS, it only took about. four months to find the original host species based on scientific evaluation.
After MERS, it took about nine months. Well, we are now almost 18 months on into this pandemic and still no host species. So again, all this evidence is circumstantial, but it continues to pile up on what we already knew and suggests that what your common sense would tell you from the [00:27:00] very beginning is the result is this pandemic most likely results from a laboratory leak.
You in your in your public statements have not been suggesting that there was anything sinister about the leak It wasn't some part of some, you know, bio terror plot or it was it was it was sloppiness incompetence That that's kind of where you're where the facts are leading to you leading you to now.
Well, that's right So I'd say the lab Is the most likely source of this virus? I don't know what was going on in the lab. I don't know if it came from the lab, how it came from the lab. It could have been a relatively simple mistake, like not following proper safety protocols. Another thing we know by now is that although it has a level four laboratory, which, you know, For a layman, just imagine you're like wearing space suits with oxygen lines hooked up to the ceilings, that sort of thing.
But in many cases, they were doing this research in what you would call level two procedures, which is really nothing more than you have at like the dentist's office. You know, white lab coat, face shield, and latex [00:28:00] gloves. Um, so either hypothesis is possible. Um, it could just be an innocent leak. It could be something.
Uh, more nefarious. We don't know and won't know unless China ever comes clean or a defector comes out. One reason why there's so much media controversy over this though is just the sloppiness of most mainstream reporters. Uh, their willingness to jump to conclusions, uh, whenever the person speaking doesn't share their politics and frankly, they're ignorant about these things.
They took Um originating in a lab as a manufactured bioweapon. Well, hold on. Let's let's break it down that when you said it was possible When you about a over a year ago said it's possible that it was originating in the lab The skeptics in the press came back and said how dare he say it was part of an you know a plot They misrepresent they misrepresented the questions I was asking about an entirely plausible hypothesis and then refuted the misrepresentation Without ever addressing what I actually said, which is [00:29:00] laboratories are the most likely location from which this virus came.
And to be clear, under that hypothesis, it wasn't necessarily a China, a uniquely Chinese government, you know, accident, because this was a project that had a multilateral, multi stakeholder scientific community basis for it, right? There were a lot of funders for this. for this work in these labs, including a body of the NIH in the U.
S., which was a one of the granting agencies for the work going on in that lab. Well, so it's not a coincidence that this did originate in a lab. It's a Chinese lab, in my opinion, in part because China has a long record of shoddy safety practices in their laboratories. You know, a version of SARS escaped from the labs, uh, back in the 2000s.
But you're also right, uh, that this was funded through multilateral sources, including Tony Fauci's agency inside the National Institutes of Health. Uh, over the last few weeks, Dr. Fauci has been [00:30:00] What I would charitably call playing word games, uh, about the facts here. Um, what some people might call misleading the American people.
There is no question that his agency funded, um, through an American organization, uh, research at the Wuhan labs. There is no question, uh, the so called bat lady. Was conducting research into ways to manipulate these viruses, make them more contagious, therefore more dangerous. Um, That's all a matter of public record.
Now, Dr. Fauci, in the last few days, having been caught red handed on this, is beginning to back away from his assertions that the NIH never funded any gain of function research into Wuhan labs. And now he's saying, well, yeah, of course, we had the research in there. That's where coronaviruses emerged from.
We weren't aware of gain of function research. Um, but if that's the case. Then we have to raise the uncomfortable question is like where is the oversight? Of his grant making process. Where is the quality control and quality assurance that American taxpayer dollars are not going to To fund this [00:31:00] kind of research and finally a third point I would add Uh, this happened after the obama white house explicitly prohibited This kind of very risky research.
Now they added, you know, one very narrow exception that could possibly apply here. But if, if Tony Fauci and NIH were funding this research in violation of at least the spirit of president Obama's directive, if not the letter itself, I think they have a lot of explaining to do to the American people. So the Obama administration was tuned into this specifically with the gain of function.
I think it was back in 2013 or 2014. There was a lot of growing media. Or I should say growing concern, uh, in the media, you know, reported journalism, um, about gain of function research, not just specifically in the Wuhan laboratories, but more broadly, whether or not the gains to scientific knowledge were worth the risk of exactly something like this happening.
Um, and therefore the Obama administration in 2014 imposed a [00:32:00] moratorium on this kind of funding. Again, they did allow certain very narrow exceptions and you can't get a straight answer yet out of. Uh, Tony Fauci, but it seems that the NIH continued funding this research, uh, in Wuhan, um, using one of those exceptions, um, apparently without informing their political supervisors at HHS or the Obama White House.
Again, I don't know that that's the case, it just appears to be the case, in part because Tony Fauci has been dancing around these questions, I think trying to protect His reputation, the reputation of his agency, and frankly, his relationships with scientists around the country and around the world. You know, that Nicholas Wade article a few weeks ago, I thought was very, uh, effective in pointing out where the incentives lie here.
And as they usually do, they lie with money and keeping the flow of research money going. And for any epidemiologist or scientist or grant making organization to blow the whistle on any of this going back seven years, or to be a dissident, [00:33:00] or certainly to do anything that might help Donald Trump in his reelection campaign would put at risk his or her funding in the future when his peers.
We're sitting on a peer review panel for his grants in the future. So, just for our listeners, uh, what Senator Cotton just referred to, uh, is Nicholas Wade, who's a former New York Times science reporter, who wrote a long piece for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, in which he very non ideologically Non emotionally, just very analytically, looked at the lab leak hypothesis and kind of laid out the case for that, and then obviously laid out a more natural origin, uh, hypothesis, and basically it just laid both out and came out that the lab leak looks far more credible, uh, than we had thought, and in just In terms of this term, gain of function, because it's a term now that's being thrown around just so our listeners understand exactly what, because there's a debate about it within the scientific [00:34:00] community, um, and what it basically is, is going to remote places in nature and collecting all sorts of dangerous pathogens and bringing them to one spot.
A lab, in this case, uh, this, this Wuhan lab, uh, if in fact, uh, this is where it originally originated to, to try and analyze and predict the potential danger of these pathogens spilling over to humans. So, you know, and as you said, there's an, there's an upside case, I guess, in the downside case. The upside case is, if we think these dangerous pathogens can ultimately spill over to humans, don't we want to know, get ahead of it, uh, ahead of time before.
It actually happens so we can be prepared. That's one reason to do the gain of function research. The downside is there's a risk that you're going to trigger the accidental release of something terrible by doing this research and cause a pandemic that if this is actually how it originated, you know, resulted in.
[00:35:00] Close to 600, 000 dead Americans, over 3 million people dead around the world, and trillions and trillions of, uh, economic cost. And that's a, that's a robust debate within the scientific community. And you're saying the, the Obama administration was already concerned about it. Yeah, in, in 2014, the concerns had grown serious enough that they imposed this moratorium.
And, you know, I, we've seen now for 15 months how Uh, these public health bureaucrats, epidemiologists, other scientists want to purport to cut off public debate among normal citizens on some of these questions, uh, which is antithetical to our constitutional form of government. The American people didn't trust experts of, or I'm sorry, the founders did not trust experts of any kind.
They trusted. the American people in their good common sense and, uh, judgment to elect people to make these decisions for them. So we should never cede, we should never cede decision making authority to these public health experts or scientists. We should listen to them, but in the same way that, [00:36:00] you know, as the saying goes, war, war is too important to leave to the generals.
I mean, these questions about. Public health and the balance of various factors, um, and public health and economic livelihoods and so forth have to be made by the American people through their representatives. Gain of function is one example of that. I mean, look, you, there can be, as you say, a robust scientific debate, but it's pretty simple.
Um, and said right there in the name, you know, you're going to gain functions, um, that make a dangerous pathogen more dangerous. There's two simple ways you can do that. You can make it more contagious or you can make it more deadly. Um, and you laid out the pros and cons for that. The Obama administration decided the cons outweigh the pros.
But it appears that Dr. Fauci's agency inside the Institutes of Health went ahead with this funding anyway. Um, and again, to my knowledge, they were, they did not get approval on that. From, uh, either the Department of Health and Human Services or the Obama White House. When it comes, I mean, spending U. S.
taxpayer dollars in a Chinese communist lab, uh, while the Obama White House has [00:37:00] prohibited that. I mean, if I were in that position, I would seek, uh, you know, approval from the electorally accountable officials, uh, who'd issued that directive. Uh, but it looks like they may have gone with asking for forgiveness instead of seeking permission.
So leading scientists and government, government officials. across party lines, elected leaders, technocratic, you know, officials in the various agencies here and around the world are now calling for a large scale investigation into the origin of SARS CoV 2. So what are the chances that this investigation, like what does this investigation actually look like?
And what's the likelihood that it will actually take place to the point that someone like you is satisfied? Um, well, it doesn't look like what President Biden said on Wednesday. He, um, put in a statement directing the American intelligence community to spend 90 days looking more closely at the matter. I mean, that's fine.
They should continue to look closely at [00:38:00] the matter, as I know they have. Uh, but the impetus should not be on America's intelligence officials. It should be on the Chinese Communist Party. And we should be demanding. Transparency from them. But look, I mean, the super secretive and very controlling Communist Party is not going to allow U.
S. government inspectors on the ground. The World Health Organization inspections so far have been something of a farce. Um, I mean, even if you let Americans or Western scientists get in, they've probably long since discovered every shred of evidence. So I'm not sure we're ever going to actually get concrete.
Um, direct evidence that the virus originated in these labs or that it originated, uh, from animal to human transmission in the wild, so to speak. Um, but again, I think the onus should be on, uh, the Chinese Communist Party and we should do everything we can to highlight. Um, just how, um, responsible they are for this pandemic [00:39:00] the world has endured.
And we should take actions to hold them accountable as well. Uh, like sanctioning the Chinese officials who covered it up. I introduced legislation named after Dr. Li Wenling, the, uh, one of the first whistleblowers in Wuhan, who regrettably died, uh, from coronavirus in the early days of this pandemic. So, your view is Hope for an investigation pressure the administration and other agencies and governments around the world for a robust.
investigation, but you're not terribly optimistic that it will see itself through. So we should just, there are enough bad facts here, even if we, even if we can't completely nail down the lab leak, uh, theory to take action. Look, yeah, these are Chinese communists. This is not some American corporation who is involved in a scandal that fires a CEO and brings in a new CEO who's going to clean house and hires outside auditors in a law firm to investigate itself and report to the public and to its [00:40:00] shareholders and employees.
We shouldn't expect that of the Chinese Communist Party. Um, I suspect that whatever direct evidence once exists has probably been destroyed. I mean, I don't think we're gonna like discover a secret server in Wuhan that tells us that that lady created this virus or that her employees, um, you know, were negligent in their safety practices and unleashed it out into downtown Wuhan when they, um, went out to go shopping at the wet market.
Um, I mean. I'd be, I'd welcome that, but I just don't think we're going to find it. Now that the one possibility we may find one day, I don't know, is a Chinese whistleblower, um, someone who was present, um, someone who fell ill, um, someone who was visited by the secret police in the early days, uh, who tipped their hand, um, in the same way, if you recall, in the fall of 2019, uh, the New York times got it hands on a trove of documents about the genocidal practices against religious and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang province that came from inside.
Uh, the Chinese Communist Party, um, must be very alarming to Xi Jinping that someone had [00:41:00] access to those documents and provided them to the New York Times. So if we ever got concrete direct evidence, um, that this virus came from the lab, I think it would probably be some something along those lines, not the result of a formal investigations.
But again, as you say, even in the absence of concrete direct evidence, all of the circumstantial evidence, I don't mean the weight of it, the preponderance of it, all of the circumstantial evidence, points directly at those labs, not at some animal roaming around downtown Woodland. Okay, let, let's, I just want to come back to a previous point you made about, uh, whistleblowers.
So, you know, it is conceivable that some of the scientists working in that lab were well intentioned, and they saw stuff that would, they saw activities that would worry them, or they saw a potential cover up that would doubly worry them. So, those scientists would, if, if we want to, Get them to cooperate would need some kind of immunity.
We need to incentivize whistleblowers. We may need financial incentives. We would need witness protection. I mean, it seems like you need a pretty robust effort [00:42:00] to it's the I mean, from a layman's perspective, that's the only way to really start cracking this thing open, to your point. Go ahead. No, you're right about that.
That's what I said. I mean, that's the most Again, I don't think any kind of like formal investigation is going to be allowed by the Chinese communists. And I don't think that even if it occurred, they would have any evidence left to discover. So someone who was involved in the research at the lab, someone who treated the early patients, someone inside the Chinese security apparatus, uh, is probably going to have to be the source of any kind of confirmation we're getting.
That would still not be direct evidence. I mean, again, I doubt they're going to be carrying the original samples from patient zero, um, or the lab. server from inside Wuhan, but it would lend even more weight to all the other evidence we already have. Um, what you're essentially talking about, Dan, is, you know, a defector, you know, to use the old Cold War term, um, that always poses challenges because they're worried about their own safety, um, and their own family and their extended family [00:43:00] inside of China.
Um, so I don't necessarily hold out a ton of hope that we're going to have. Um, that kind of whistleblower in the future, but that's probably the most, the most likely way we would get, um, the most direct confirmation we ever will get. Gain of function research used to be something that, say, requires significant resources that only governments could provide.
Um, now the technology for this research has become pretty cheap, so now there's some scientists who are saying you can basically set up a lab for like 100, 000 to create a virus like, COVID, you know, something like it and set it free. So what, like from your perch at the Senate Intelligence Committee, what kind of monitoring and surveillance infrastructure could be put into place to control for biological disasters, which much like terrorism and the way we did surveillance and intelligence gathering for terrorist plots after 9 11, you know, the ease of setting up a terrorist Plot was so the barriers to entry were [00:44:00] low.
The capabilities were so widely dispersed. The costs were not obstacles. The financial costs were heading into a world that is similar with this gain of function research. If you have really bad malevolent actors, which is not what we necessarily were dealing with in Wuhan, but could be dealing with in the future.
Are we set up for this? We are getting better at it, um, and I think the last year and a half has shown that we have to continue to improve. I mean, this is something that is a genuine threat from the nation state adversaries we have, like China. You know, synthetic biology is one of the ten focus areas of China's so called Maiden China 2025 blueprint for economic espionage, and the People's Liberation Army, um, has written about it.
Um, the military struggle in the domain of biology and considered the possibility of genetically selective bioweapons. Um, Avril Haines, the director of national [00:45:00] intelligence, uh, specifically emphasized that threat in her public testimony to the intelligence committee last month. Um, but you're also right that, um, as, as this technology gets less expensive, um, and, um, More scaled down.
It's something that could be done by non nation state actors with the right skill sets and enough freedom of action Um, so that's one reason why it's important that we you know Keep groups like al qaeda and isis pinned down that we don't give them freedom That we don't create safe havens in the world for which they can set up what are still reasonably sized laboratories, if not the size of, you know, the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
Um, and that we recognize that they've been able to see over the last year and a half just how massively disruptive a relatively, Um, you know, small little virus could be, not just to the United States, but to the entire Western world. Um, the further, another thing we need to do is [00:46:00] harden up our defenses.
I mean, one reason why we haven't had a major terrorist attack like 9 11 since 9 11 is that we've kept our foot on the throat of Al Qaeda. And isis and other islamic terror organizations, but another reason is that we have hardened up our defenses It should be much harder to execute that operation day, even if a terrorist group had freedom of action Um, so we need to continue to harden our pandemic defenses for the future to strengthen our controls, uh borders and ports of entry Be more willing to shut down travel, uh from effective errors rapidly Despite cries against it as you saw from the democrats last year, even though they now admit that it was appropriate Um, and we need to, uh, be sure that things like our national stockpile are, um, are replenished and, and also have the flexibility for the future, um, so we're not investing in the wrong kind of thing.
You know, it turned out for a time that most doctors wanted to use ventilators on, uh, coronavirus patients. That may not have been the best course of action, but that's what most people worried about running out of. In March and [00:47:00] April, well, the next time around, it may be some other kind of medical device or some other kind of medicine that we need.
Um, and we need to have a kind of baseline capacity, not just, uh, what we have stockpiled, but what we can rapidly produce in the United States. Uh, and that's one reason why it's so important that we reshore some of this relatively simple, but vital manufacturing capability from places like China. Okay, last question for you, uh, let's assume that at some point, I know you think it's unlikely, but assume at some point that proof is obtainable and that an investigation can prove that this was indeed a negligent lab leak that cost the lives, as I said earlier, of three million plus people, trillions and trillions and trillions of dollars.
In, in, uh, economic loss, what then like do you hang a bill of trillions of dollars and millions of lives lost around the world and hundreds of thousands of lives lost in the U. S. Do you hang that on the on the [00:48:00] Chinese Communist Party? Do you hang that on the Wuhan lab? Do you? Do you hang that on the scientific community that was behind this gain of function research at this level?
For biosafety lab in china, but had multiple parties from around the world. Where do we go at that point? You hang that on the chinese communist party Now as you say there needs to be accounting, uh for others who might have been involved in what was happening that laboratory to include Our own government, um, dr Fauci's agency at the national institutes of health the world health organization the role they played especially in the early days of accepting chinese Propaganda.
Um, but ultimately this is the responsibility of the Chinese government and there need to be actions taken to make them pay for it. You know, I mentioned my Li Wenling sanctions bill. I also have legislation that would open federal courts, um, to people who have been injured by the virus, which is basically every American.
Um to seek redress in the same way that we did for the 9 11 victims to further isolate [00:49:00] China diplomatically for instance to rebid the winter olympics before 2022 um to cut off chinese, uh investments, um into Other countries, especially allied countries, to stop the spread of Chinese, uh, information technology and telecommunications technology.
There are many ways to make China accountable for what they have done to the world over the last, uh, year and a half. And finally, do you think you would get Uh, I do. It does seem to me during coronavirus that China's, you know, public diplomacy and just general reputation and influence, at least at the peak of the crisis diminished in places, countries throughout Europe and elsewhere.
Do you, A, do you think That sustains and b do you think that those governments join with the u. s and taking these kinds of actions? I I do think it will uh sustain itself. I mean if you look at what's just happened in europe china, [00:50:00] uh trumpeted, uh, Um a big trade and investment deal with the eu and the final days of the trump administration Which was held up as a great example of how china is overcoming Um its black sheep status after the coronavirus um and a thumb in the eye to both The outgoing and the incoming administration.
Well, that trade deal is largely on ice now because EU members of parliament condemned china for its genocide against Its own people in xinjiang province china sanctioned those nps and just a few days ago Uh, the european parliament voted overwhelmingly like 90 to 10 percent of the parliament not to proceed with the implementation of that deal imagine imagine And in that context, piling on what they've done to Hong Kong, if you pile on conclusive proof, acceptable to public opinion in general around the world, that this virus was no accidental virus that just occurred, but was the result [00:51:00] of Chinese negligence in those labs, and then Chinese deceitfulness in covering up what had happened in those labs.
Senator Cotton, you were a clear and sober and analytical voice on this crisis early on and I think our listeners We got to hear some of that as well today, well over a year into it, and we will hopefully have you back to let us know how you are seeing things as they develop, as we learn more, as hopefully there are real investigations, as we form a coherent view on what happened.
So thanks for joining us. Thank you, Dan. Thanks for having me on.
That's our show for today. There's a ton to read on this topic, but one of the many pieces we strongly recommend is one I referred to several times on this episode, which was Nicholas Wade's recent piece on Medium. Nick's a former New York Times science reporter. His piece is a long one, but again, highly recommend it.
We'll post the link on the show [00:52:00] notes. If you want to follow Jim Meggs, you can follow him on Twitter. He's at James Meggs, J A M E S M E I G S. You can also find his work on Commentary Magazine and at Manhattan Institute, which is manhattan institute. org. Be sure to subscribe to Jim's podcast, How Do We Fix It, which you can find wherever you get your podcasts.
If you want to follow Senator Tom Cotton, best is to start on Twitter at SenTomCotton. S E N T O M C O T T O N. And of course, you can also read latest news about and by Senator Cotton on his website. If you have questions or ideas for future episodes, tweet at me, at Dan Senor. Post Corona is produced and edited by Alon Benatar.
Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.
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