The hostage deal: a new phase in the war - with Amos Harel
Amos Harel has been the military correspondent and defense analyst for Israel's Haaretz newspaper for 25 years. He is among the most well-sourced and thoughtful journalists and analysts covering Israeli security affairs inside Israel. Prior to his current position, Amos spent four years as night editor for the Haaretz Hebrew print edition, and from 1999-2005 he was the anchor on a weekly Army Radio program about defense issues.
Along with frequent "Call Me Back" guest and Fauda co-creator Avi Issacharoff, Amos co-wrote a book about the Second Intifada, called "The Seventh War: How we won and why we lost the war with the Palestinians", which was published in 2004 and translated into several languages, including Arabic.
Amos and Avi also co-wrote "34 Days: Israel, Hezbollah and the War in Lebanon", about the war of 2006, which was published in 2008.
Transcript
DISCLAIMER: THIS TRANSCRIPT HAS BEEN CREATED USING AI TECHNOLOGY AND MAY NOT REFLECT 100% ACCURACY.
[00:00:00] The whole efforts of the country was shattered, and I think that it will take a lot of time for us to recover. And, and my personal hope is that we'll see. All of those terrorists who were involved in this slaughter, in this massacre, pay the ultimate price. I really do hope that the IDF would kill them all, but would that mean that we actually won the war?
I think that this is problematic, and we need to survive somehow in this region, and we need to be stronger and tougher, and there are a lot of conclusions from that regarding the IDF, our strategic behavior in the region at large, our relationship with the United States, all of that, but I don't think that a decisive victory Is in the cards.
It's much more complicated than that. We can try to improve our situation, but that's not the end of the story. I'm not talking in terms of victory. I'm sad to say this, but this is the reality.[00:01:00]
It is Thursday, November 23rd at 10 a. m. in New York City. Happy Thanksgiving. It is 5 p. m. in Israel. As Israelis brace for the implementation. of the return of the first group of hostages from Gaza. According to latest reports, the implementation of the ceasefire and the release of the first hostages has been delayed until tomorrow, Friday, November 24th, with the ceasefire to be implemented at 9 a.
m. and the first group of 13 hostages to be Released at 4 p. m. Both of those are Israel times to discuss the implementation of the hostage deal and the implications for the future of this war, which does seem to be entering a new phase as a result of the hostage deal. [00:02:00] We will be joined by Amos Harel.
Amos is one of the busiest people in journalism in Israel. He is one of the top, if not the top. national security reporter, and we are very much looking forward to this conversation. Just a little bit of background on Amos. He's been a military correspondent and defense analyst for Haaretz, one of Israel's leading national newspapers, for the last 12 years.
Prior to his current position, Amos spent four years as the night editor for the Haaretz Hebrew Print Edition, and from 1999 to 2005, he was the anchor on a weekly army radio program about defense issues. Now, I first got to know Amos in Israel many, many, many years ago through Avi Issacharoff, who's been a regular guest on this podcast and is a close friend.
Avi and Amos used to be reporting partners at Haaretz. They worked together covering the Arab world, covering the [00:03:00] Palestinian communities in the West Bank and Gaza. The two of them really collectively penetrated a lot of sources in the terrorist organizations operating in the West Bank and Gaza. And in Lebanon, and obviously they have tremendous sources within the defense establishment.
And they wrote a book about the Second Intifada, which was published in 2004, called The Seventh War. How we won? And why we lost the war with the Palestinians, which was translated into several languages, including Arabic, was a bestseller in Israel, and Avi and Amos also wrote another book in 2008 about the second Lebanon war, which was called 34 days Israel.
Hezbollah and the war in Lebanon. It was about the Second Lebanon War, which was in 2006. I highly recommend this book, Thirty Four Days, if you can get your hands on it. Because this book in particular is very instructive about what Israel is dealing with in the north, with Hezbollah, [00:04:00] and the considerations the Israeli government must be going through when it thinks about if or when to confront Hezbollah.
But now on to our conversation with Amos Harel on the hostage deal. Where it actually stands and what it means for this next phase of the war. This is, call Me Back
and I'm pleased to welcome to this podcast for the first time. My longtime friend, almost Harrell, who I think I met, I think I met almost 20 years ago for the first time I actually remember in Tel Aviv. Uh, Amos, thank you for being with us. I know you are. Uh. Incredibly busy these days. So, um, I'm really grateful for you taking a little bit of time to help us understand what's going on.
Thanks for inviting me. Then I wanna start with what is front and center. Uh, we, we will get to the state of the overall war momentarily, but first, uh. [00:05:00] To the best of your understanding, what are the key points of this hostage release deal? Uh, we still don't know if it's on, uh, the hostage deal, uh, was supposed, um, to start this morning, Israeli time about 10 o'clock.
But, uh, yesterday, Wednesday evening, uh, close to midnight after, uh, Benjamin Netanyahu had a press conference, uh, uh, explaining his decision, uh, to go for the deal. It turned out that there were some final problems between Israel, Hamas, and Qatar. Now we're still awaiting a final, uh, statement regarding, uh, where the deal, uh, is, uh, currently.
Uh, what we know is that there's a general agreement about the release of 50, uh, Israeli hostages. Uh, mainly, uh, mothers and their children. Uh, we don't know exactly what the criteria is. It's not all the mothers and children. It's not all women. It's not all young people. It doesn't include all the [00:06:00] women Or older men at all.
So it's just about I'd say one fifth close to one fifth of the number of actual hostages held by Hamas. The deal says that there will be Ceasefire for four days in fighting in Gaza And in return, uh, Hamas would release those 50 hostages. Hamas also is committed, apparently, to try and release more hostages.
And if Hamas can make it to, uh, 10 hostages a day, then Israel would promise it, um, um, further days of, uh, ceasefire. Meaning another day of ceasefire for any, um, released, 10 released hostages. Uh, on top of that, Israel would release 150 Palestinian prisoners, all of them, uh, women and minors. This is not a big deal currently in Israel, but the main discussion is about the ceasefire since, um, I'd say the majority of Israelis [00:07:00] support, uh, the continuation of the war and think that Hamas should be defeated, uh, on the military level.
Uh, there are a lot of people who have, um, second thoughts about this whole agreement. On the other hand, this is a huge emotional issue. Uh, these are innocent civilians. They were, they saw their family members slaughtered by Hamas. They were brutally taken to Gaza. We don't know how they're held, under which conditions.
Um, apparently they're harsh. And I think that the majority of Israelis also feel that there's an obligation to try and correct some wrongs. Meaning, as far as we can, uh, make it, try and save people from this. Hell, they're in, in Gaza right now. And try as much as we can, uh, to take them out of the war zone.
Uh, if it's possible. This doesn't mean the end of the war. I think the war would continue once the, um, deal, uh, is over with. Do you think that there's any constituency [00:08:00] in the Israeli public? That is concerned that it, it could stymie the war effort. You're saying it sounds like it doesn't at the end of the day, but is there any constituency within Israeli society that thinks this could stymie the war effort and, or it sets another bad precedent for, set another bad precedent for Israel agreeing to a deal that rewards hostage taking.
Now, obviously it's not nowhere near as bad a precedent as 2011 where over 1, 000. Uh, Palestinians were released for one soldier, Gilad Shalit, which was a very lopsided deal. And obviously, uh, Sinwar was part of that deal. And he got out of two or three life sentences and got back to Gaza. And here we are, you know, over a decade later with him being the, one of the architects of this massacre.
So it's, it's nothing like that, but still, is there a question by some Israeli society that we got burned in 2011, we will have rued the day based on what happened on October 7th for that 2011 [00:09:00] deal. And we're doing another version of that again, and we're setting ourselves up in the future for another, uh, another scenario where our enemies see what we're willing to do to get Israeli hostages back, which just incentivizes hostage taking.
I think the situation is rather different this time. You can hear this sentiment, but mostly from the far right. The only, um, party in the government who actually voted against the deal was Otzma Yehudit, led by Itamar Benkvir, the most extreme member. of the Israeli government, and Ben Gurion and two of his ministers objected to the deal.
Even Betzalel Smotrich, who is also quite a hardliner right wing ideologist, he said he opposed the deal before the discussion in the government, but actually on Wednesday, early Wednesday morning, he voted for the deal. So, I don't think it's a general sentiment shared by many, this whole notion of surrender to terrorism.
This is not the [00:10:00] discussion right now. The price is too high. It's not one soldier. Again, these are dozens and dozens of innocent people, civilians, um, women and children, helpless there, held by terrorists, by Hamas, under extreme conditions. So the discussion is quite different than the discussion over one soldier and the release of a thousand prisoners.
And as I mentioned, We're talking of 150, uh, um, uh, Palestinian prisoners and these are not, um, mega terrorists. These are mostly people who, uh, try to stab Israelis or so on. It's not, it's not, uh, this is not the big issue right now. The bigger issue is the ceasefire, the fear that perhaps Uh, because, uh, Sinoel would play for time, because Yigit Sinoel, the leader of Hamas, would try, um, to, um, somehow, psychologically, uh, fight Israelis over this, to, um, um, you know, uh, get on our nerves regarding this, and to play, [00:11:00] to, to, to, um, arrange all kinds of emotional dramas regarding the release of hostages and the, and those personal Those huge, uh, personal disasters, uh, that happen.
The fear is that Sinuel would somehow play this. In order to continue the ceasefire, let's say for nine or ten days, keeping, um, he would say that, you know, that he needs some more time to only release just a few more kids. It's about kids, right? Don't we care about our kids? And then things would get delayed.
And then we know that the public opinion in the United States among Democrats, or at least among progressives, is changing over that. We know that the Europeans want a ceasefire as well. And I think the fear among many who still support a deal under these circumstances is that we're taking this too far.
They don't care about the Palestinian prisoners, um, going free, they're afraid. Uh, that at some point we won't have this, um, momentum anymore, and we won't continue [00:12:00] fighting. And again, I'm not, you know, I'm, I was never a warmonger, I'm not somebody who's happy about war or military operations. But I need to say that, um, considering everything that happened, the massacre, the terrible massacre of October 7th, I think that I, myself, like the majority of Israelis, I think that, uh, in spite of all these difficulties, uh, the IDF needs to continue its job, even if that means another ground incursion in the southern part of the Gaza Strip, and even if that means more fighting and more bloodshed and more, uh, military losses for Israel.
Because in the eyes of many Israelis, there's no other choice. If you don't defeat Hamas as an organization, not as an idea, nobody can, uh, destroy the idea, the ideology. But if you don't defeat its military capabilities, if you don't drive them out, people like Yisrael Sinuol and Mohamed Def, that not only are we not talking of possible peace with the Palestinians in the future, uh, this means hell on earth for both [00:13:00] sides for many more years to come if Israel doesn't do, uh, a more decisive job about that.
Is the IDF capable? That's another discussion. What would happen, considering the fact that two million Palestinian, uh, citizens are now squeezed into, uh, a very small area in the southern part of the Gaza Strip? These are all very problematic issues. And yet, the majority of Israelis feel that this war needs to continue and that the IDF actually needs to increase the power, the military power, military strength it's, uh, projecting and using in order to, uh, defeat Hamas decisively.
Amos, this is a very important point, and I want to come back to the hostage deal in a moment, but you're zeroing in on a point I'm sensing in all my conversations with Israelis, regardless of their political leanings, which is a commitment. to fighting Hamas very aggressively, even trying to eradicate Hamas to the extent that that is possible.
There's no, there's no softness, if you will, [00:14:00] in that position. That's a pretty hardheaded, strongly held view or goal among everyone from, from the head of the labor party to, you know, all across the political spectrum to the right, which I've never really seen. In all my years of following Israeli politics and Israeli public opinion, is that, is that your sense, what you're, what you're, what you're articulating is a pretty widely held view.
I just don't think people in the US appreciate to the extent to which that is. That is, there's this consensus. I, I think that's exactly the point. I think that we suffered on October, uh, seventh, a sort of, uh, communal, uh, shock, A collective shock for Israelis, maybe for Jews at large around the world. The scenes in Kibbutz Be'eri and Kibbutz Kfar Azza and Kibbutz Nahal Oz and atals like Sderot and Ofakim, this massive, this mass murdering, uh, going on by Hamas terrorists.
This is a shock, which is in, by Israeli standards, considering the fact that the country's, uh, so small, it's [00:15:00] probably for us, it's bigger than 9 11. And we've been dealing with Palestinians and terrorism and Iranian influence and so on for 30, 40, one could say 70 or 100 years. This is more shocking than anything we've experienced in the past.
And I think that however ever people, however much people would like to, uh, forget about this, all people are still afraid of, uh, mil young military casualties, young soldiers, uh, dying while fighting the enemy and so on. And that's always a big deal in Israel. There's still this, um, communal memory of this disaster in OC on October 7th, and in the end, these were death squads.
This was nothing else. These were depth squads. It's not a military operation. This was a terrorist operation, and more than that, this was meant to strike fear at the heart of Jews, at the heart of Israelis, and to gradually drive us out of the country or, or, or the region. Hamas, uh, leaders, um, actually bragged [00:16:00] about this to the New York Times, saying we're changing the rules of the game, we're hijacking, if you'd like, the, the Palestinian, um, struggle against Israel, and we're forcing our, um, version of this struggle.
On the region at large. This is what they attempted to do and all those terrible atrocities the the rapes the the killings the Mutilations the the kidnappings and so on are part of this. This is was done Systematically, the people who took part in this were indoctrinated, many of them, to do that by religious leaders and so on.
This is what they meant to do. They can now try to explain that the, you know, the mob got carried away and so on. This was something done systematically. These are death squads. And this is why it shaped Israeli opinion in such a massive way. And it moved us all I don't want to talk in terms of right and left regarding this.
It's not exactly about Uh, political positions. But it did move us [00:17:00] into a position, a collective position, if you'd like, for most Israelis, uh, that supports much more, uh, aggressive, uh, means, uh, to be used against the Palestinians. And now there's a whole discussion in the world about the carnage in Gaza, 15, 000 people who died, maybe more, two thirds of them civilians and so on, the destruction in the northern part of Gaza.
Uh, looks like many, uh, cities now, looks like many cities went through. Uh, such fighting in recent years, Mosul and Raqqa, and there are other, uh, towns across the region who suffer. You're referring to the, the ISIS wars, basically the towns in, in, in, in Iraq and elsewhere where, where the U. S. forces decimated.
Completely did. I'm quite familiar with what happened in Mosul in particular, completely flattened Mosul and you're right. It looks no different. Gaza today looks no different than those places where the U. S. decided we just have to wipe out ISIS. So the destruction is quite similar. The difference, [00:18:00] of course, is that this is happening next door.
It's not happening 7, 000 miles away. It's happening, uh, um, a mile away from, uh, Kibbutz Nahal Oz, less than a mile from Kibbutz Nahal Oz or from Kibbutz Kfar Azar or two miles from Sderot. So it's happening next door. And Israelis now, even liberal, uh, leaning Israelis have less patience for the world, uh, complaining about this, considering what has happened, and considering the fact that this has remained unsolved.
We still have 235, uh, people kidnapped by Hamas, hostages, held hostages, mostly We don't know neither the whereabouts or if they're alive at all. And these are women and children mostly, as I mentioned, and old people, innocents, all of them innocents. These are, these were not people who were fighting Hamas in any kind of way.
And we should remind, uh, your listeners that there was a ceasefire. First of all, that Israel, uh, did, uh, um, disengage from Gaza in 2005. And secondly, that there was a ceasefire and that Israel was discussing on [00:19:00] October 5th and 6th. With Qatar, the possibility of allowing more Palestinians from Gaza. To work in Israel in order to improve the, uh, economic situation in Gaza itself.
Something that, for some reason, most Israelis, including myself, felt that, uh, Sinual cared deeply about. It turned out that they didn't give a shit. Sorry, I'm not sure if I'm allowed to say that. You're, you're allowed to. This is, this, this, this is not necessarily PG. Um, why did, I mean, you just raised a very important point, which I've been curious about.
What did the Israeli establishment, security establishment and the Israeli press, you, you among them, I guess, get wrong about Sinwar? Like how, how the, you're basically saying the, the assumption embedded in the security doctrine of Israel is that Sinwar and the other leaders had some practical objectives as it related to governing Gaza and they would never want to provoke the complete destruction of Gaza, uh, on the Palestinian people living there.
And, and yet. That assumption sounds like it was completely wrong. Unless they believed that Israel wouldn't unleash hell on Gaza. [00:20:00] Unless they believed by getting all those hostages, Israel would hold back. So, okay, so this is quite complicated. And it's part of the, um, uh, of a larger disaster, military and intelligence disaster that, uh, many people call the, the concept.
Israel holding the wrong concept about Gaza. Now, I'm partly to blame as well. Although there were cases in which I felt differently. Including an article on October 5th, I'm trying to defend myself now, saying that the recent ceasefire with Hamas was wrong, and that Israel was wrongfully, uh, uh, assuming that Sinuol is, uh, is more of a moderate than he was before, and that this, we may be taking the wrong path.
I wrote this because I was listening to the right people who warned me that the majority of the experts and the decision makers Far differently, but this was a dangerous path for Israel, but going back to this concept if you'd like The general assumption was that he's, uh, Sinoiris, the leader of Hamas, a man who, as you may have [00:21:00] mentioned earlier, was released in 2011 during the Shalit, uh, deal, spent 22 years in Israeli prison, speaks perfect Hebrew, and so on.
The notion was that, on the one hand, he was a terrorist, of course, and he believed in Muqawwama and resistance against Israel, but also that he was a political leader, and that having, uh, to take care of the lives of 2. 1, A million people in Gaza, he wanted them to improve their lives and that he needed to consider whenever he provoked Israel that if he went too far, this would bring the wrath of Israel on Gaza and that people in Gaza would suffer.
So the latest round of violence between Hamas and Israel was called Guardian of the Walls. These are the Israeli military terms for the operations. That happened May, uh, 21. And after that operation, which ended as usual in a sort of a miserable draw, the Israeli leadership, still led by Netanyahu, who lost, um, who stopped being in office a short time later, was replaced by [00:22:00] Naftali Bennett.
But the Israeli leadership, both the military and the political leadership, persuaded itself and tried to persuade the public that this was a great victory. that Hamas was deterred, that Hamas was afraid of us, that Hamas was weaker than before, and therefore there was no reason to really fear Hamas.
Later on, both the Netanyahu government, the Bennett and Lapid governments, and later on, once Netanyahu came into power, they all were part of the same belief that Hamas could be both deterred And could also be persuaded to be part of a long term ceasefire, nothing, um, there's no chance of talking about a final peace agreement with them because Hamas would never recognize Israel ideologically, but they could be bribed, if you like, through Qatari money.
And through work, for work permits for Gazans in Israel to, uh, resume the ceasefire for a long time. And this, of course, was a terrible mistake. The Qatari money pouring into Gaza was mostly spent on digging those tunnels, and buying those rockets, and buying [00:23:00] those RPGs, and buying AK 47s and so on. And they were spending all this time preparing for this, their masterstroke, this terrible attack which ended in this massacre.
All across the towns and villages along the Gaza border. This is what they were preparing for. They were intentionally misleading both Israel and the world saying, Yes, we, of course, we oppose Israel, the Zionist entity. But for the time being, we, um, uh, we, we can, you know, we can leave, live in peace and we're invested in the, uh, improving the lives of Gaza.
Now, look, Israel has suffered an extreme blow. The price to pay for Gazans Is much more, not only the sheer numbers, think of the northern part of the Gaza Strip, not only Gaza City, Gaza Strip, the northern part, is destroyed. This is something similar in a way to the Nakba, their disaster in 1948 during the War of Independence.
Half, half of the Gazan [00:24:00] population had to leave their homes because Israel warned them that if not They may be killed, uh, caught in the crossfire between the IDF and Hamas and be killed. And they're now refugees in their own area, refugees for the second or third time. And this was all brought about by, uh, Sinual.
The problem, of course, is that Sinual doesn't care. He thinks in jihadi terms. He sees himself as a new Saladin, defeating the crusaders. And he's more than happy about the consequences because now for him, it's a chance to both to, uh, inflict pain on Israelis and also to take control. of the Palestinian cause, and finally defeat his enemies from the PLO, from the Palestinian Authority.
It's been 49 days since the war started, since October 7th. Why now, as it relates to a hostage deal? Like, who, whose, whose choice was it to move now? Was it, who, I guess who, who, who had control of the clock, as it relates to this hostage deal now? Was [00:25:00] it Sinwar, or was it the Israeli leadership, the war cabinet?
I think it was mostly about Sinwal, and I think because of the massive military pressure from Israel, Sinwal needs to cave in. It's not a big deal for him. He needs to get rid of most of the women and children held by Hamas because, uh, his intentions and his actions were actually exposed on October 7th.
Uh, I'm not sure that he wanted the world to know that Hamas was behaving like ISIS, but it was the Hamas terrorists themselves with the GoPro cameras who documented everything and all of this was brought, was broadcasted live. And this is what created this equation of Hamas. It's equal to ISIS. But wasn't the broadcasting of it all part of the plan?
It seems to me that that being so widespread couldn't have just been independent Hamas terrorists just acting Yes, that's true. Going rogue. That's true, but up to a point. I think what happened is, uh, [00:26:00] that their success was more than they planned in advance. And I'm not sure that he had control of everything that happened.
He had the idea. And as I said, as I said, they were indoctrinated to do that. But the fact that all of this would broadcast, and that the world reaction was so big, and that the numbers were so high, about 1100 people dying on the first day, most of them as civilians, as I said, this meant damage for him, damage for Iran to some extent, and damage mostly for Qatar.
Who's now doing, uh, damage control and trying to, um, uh, to go for a deal, to mediate as a broker for a deal, exactly because of all of this international, uh, damage. Now, on top of this, you have the military pressure. Uh, you have to remember there's almost four weeks of massive Israeli, uh, ground operation inside Northern Gaza.
Hamas is bleeding. We assume that close to 5, 000 Hamas terrorists. Have died already and Hamas needs air. They need the ceasefire in order to somewhat recover [00:27:00] and prepare for the next stages. I think I would assume that Sinwal still feels that he's, he has the upper hand, that he has achieved this great victory for, uh, uh, Palestinian, uh, jihadism on October 7th, and that things remain the same for him.
But still, under all this military pressure, he's now willing to negotiate and presumably reach a deal. Um, you may remember that around, uh, the end of October, there were discussions of a similar deal. And what happened then was that after a few days of negotiations with the Qataris and Israel, after a few hostages Four hostages were, uh, uh, released by Hamas.
Uh, there was a belief that this was over very soon, that there will be a similar deal, and perhaps Israel would not take the, uh, ground incursion route into Gaza. But then what happened was that the Israelis realized that Sinoir was not serious about that, that he was only trying to, trying to, um, postpone, to delay the ground incursion.
And this is why the Israelis decided to, uh, decided to act. Now, almost [00:28:00] four weeks later, on the one hand, Hamas apparently, we don't know yet, um, Sinuol may, uh, may not be as good as this word, and that would not be the first time, but apparently Hamas is willing now to reach a deal on the one hand, and on the other, the Israeli leadership knows, uh, that time is of the essence now.
We have a very narrow window of opportunity, and perhaps if we don't get them out now, those 50 hostages, they may not be alive in a week or two. And listen, look at the, at the names and the faces and the ages of the people being, uh, released. This is, these are not only innocent, but helpless people. If you don't save them now, and God knows at what Where they're held and what's done to them right now, we may, you know, we may lose touch with them.
Think of the Israeli tragedies. You remember the case, of course, of the IDF navigator from the Air Force, Ron Arad, lost forever in Lebanon [00:29:00] because we tried to reach a deal and couldn't in the late 80s. You may have dozens of Ron Arads, and all of them civilians, or most of them civilians. So the general belief among the decision makers Uh, was that if you don't act now, even considering, uh, those, uh, concessions that we're making, we may lose the chance of, of, of saving these hostages.
This is what happened. It sounds like Sinwar's strategic lever is the release of hostages and he can, he can choose how to, how to trickle them out and use the hostages. I hate to say this so clinically, but he can use them as a form of currency. Does Israel have its own strategic lever as it relates to, it now basically controls Northern Gaza?
Uh, And that's its own strategic lever, right? I mean, in terms of what it does in northern Gaza with northern Gaza and what it does beyond northern Gaza. That's true, but I don't think it has much to do with the deal. Israel applied huge military pressure. Apparently, we've [00:30:00] reached a deal, there's a chance of saving those 50 hostages and perhaps some more hostages in the next few days after the, uh, four days of, uh, ceasefire being announced.
But other than that, it's not so much about the hostages anymore, it's about what's going on in the battlefield. And what Israel would do once the ceasefire is over is, I think, continue for a few days, um, the army would continue working in those, uh, northern and eastern neighborhoods of the Gaza Strip. At one point or another, it will announce a mission accomplished, not meaning we've defeated Hamas completely, but we've destroyed what we've seen, we've blown up most of the tunnels we know about, we've, uh, inflicted massive pain and damage over Hamas, apparently we destroyed large parts of Gaza City and the, uh, and its outskirts.
And now we're moving to the south. This is what would happen. Israel would continue to prevent Hamas and Gazans from moving back to the northern [00:31:00] part, which is unlivable anyway. And I think it will hold a sort of, um, um, security parameter of about a mile from the border, from the Gaza border, meaning preventing with fire anyone from getting near the border.
It won't be enough to persuade the residents of those, uh, Kibbutzin, those communities that were attacked. To come home immediately and anyway, there needs, we need time to rebuild all of those, uh, uh, devastated communities. But this is what Israel would do. The second stage, and it, this is, I'm not telling you any military secrets here, it was said publicly by the chief of staff of the IDF, General, uh, Elti Alevi.
The second stage would probably be going into the southern part of Gaza. And doing something similar in places like Khan Yunus and, uh, Rafah and all of those, uh, refugee camps in the center of the Gaza Strip. This would be painful. It would be very, very difficult to do because, uh, Hamas remaining battalions, around a half [00:32:00] of them, Uh, are situated there because the leadership is hiding there, probably on the ground at Hanulis, because they are surrounded by human shields, whether it's Palestinian population or our own Israeli hostages.
This would be quite painful to do, but apparently, right now, this is what the IDF is planning. Uh, the War Cabinet supports it, not only Netanyahu and Galant, Galant is the most hawkish member. of the, uh, security cabinet or the war cabinet, but also people like, uh, Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot, two centrist ministers who joined the coalition because of the war, uh, ex, two ex chiefs of staff of the army who one would consider moderates in usual times, but are now quite hawkish about the, what needs to be done, uh, during the, the next part of the war.
We hear a lot about the tunnel system. We haven't seen a ton. Of the, of the depth and complexity of the tunnel system that we've heard a lot about. What would it [00:33:00] take to actually destroy this tunnel system that you say Hamas has been using these billions and billions of dollars from Qatar and other countries and other international and international organizations to build over a long period of time?
It sounds like it's, it's pretty complex, it's pretty deep, and it's pretty dangerous for Israel to To try to actually really clean out. I think it would be impossible to wipe out completely. Um, there's talk of tunnels, 500 kilometers of tunnels, uh, underground and so on. We don't know exactly how long this is.
We know that this was, uh, dug, uh, quite, uh, deeply. Perhaps, uh, 60 yards or more, uh, underground. And we know that they have prepared this for years. Uh, it's true that Israel is blowing up many of these tunnels right now. It's discovering them. It's blowing them up either by airstrikes or just by using, um, um, all kinds of explosives by the ground forces and many, many of these tunnels, uh, are destroyed, but I don't [00:34:00] think that will be enough.
Uh, to destroy the project completely. The other question is whether at one point we could apply enough pressure, uh, that would mean that this is no longer an asset for Hamas. Because that's rather clear that Hamas leadership, and not only its leadership, but thousands of terrorists are hiding on the ground all of this time.
They're using this as a launching pad for attacks against Israelis in those areas in which they fight. And then again, these are small numbers of Hamas members who are actually fighting Israel, uh, constantly. The others are hiding underground and they're prepared for this. They have been preparing for years and years and years.
The question is, can we at one point or another make the condition to look the Uh, the living conditions of the ground unbearable for Hamas. We haven't succeeded in that yet. Uh, there were all kinds of ideas flooding that with seawater and so on. I don't know of anything that has succeeded yet. There are all kinds of talk of technological solutions.
Uh, nothing has been too [00:35:00] successful yet, but we know that the airstrikes are being more and more effective and that parts of this, what we call the metal, the, if you like, the underground system, undergirds them. Uh, so we're destroying parts of this, but not the whole project. It's almost impossible to do, uh, right now.
Uh, another interesting, um, quote I noticed, I think Musa Abu Marzouk, one of Hamas's leaders abroad was asked, I think in an American television station, uh, maybe a narrative TV station, he was asked, why didn't Hamas Um, um, help hide some of the poor citizens of Gaza, the civilians, in its tunnel system in order for them to be saved from the Israeli airstrikes.
And he said, no, that's not our problem. These tunnels were built to defend us. The civilians should be left above ground, and this is a problem for Israel and the U. S. This is exactly the concept. This is the line of thinking among uh, Sirwal and the people who follow him. They don't really care about the uh, Palestinian population.[00:36:00]
In terms of your, you're following closely the deliberations among Israeli decision makers and even the technocratic types below the decision makers in the various, in the various ministries and the war councils and the war council and the, and the MOD, Ministry of Defense. What kind of thought, where do you think the, how advanced is the thinking on what, who governs I mean, I know there's a lot of bluster, you know, Netanyahu saying it's not going to be the Palestinian Authority.
I'm skeptical that it really won't be the Palestinian Authority. It may not be Abu Mazen, but it's not I think the Palestinian Authority option is real, at least more real than the Israeli government is broadcasting. But then there's these other options that are being talked about, some international effort, maybe some Arab countries, even though the Arab government say they want nothing to do with it.
Um, how advanced is the thinking on this? To me, this is like, this is like a core, a core question that [00:37:00] needs to be answered pretty quickly. Um, we have two problems regarding this. One is that it's too soon to tell. We're just in the midst of the massive ground operation and the, the fate of the war hasn't been decided yet.
The second problem is that Netanyahu is doing everything he can to avoid all issues, all discussion, uh, regarding the day after. We see a lot of American, uh, frustration with this. The Biden administration, of course, supports ideas along the lines you've mentioned. They also talk of moving forward with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank later on, something, uh, Netanyahu wants to, uh, avoid like the plague.
And, um, Meaning moving forward with the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and expanding into Gaza. Uh, one issue, and secondly, somehow reviving the peace process. But you have to remember, it's not only an ideological, uh, issue for Netanyahu, who always opposed, mostly opposed, uh, the two state solution, except for a short [00:38:00] time under, uh, President Obama.
But other than that, Netanyahu not only opposes that, his whole concept of political survival, which I, I don't see as, uh, um, um, plausible anyway. But he, if he wants to stay in power, he needs the far right. He needs the settlers, he needs Smotrich and Benfield. And these guys, of course, oppose any kind of idea regarding, um, uh, the Palestinian Authority somewhere or somehow involved.
in what's going on in Gaza after, uh, the war. So Netanyahu refuses any kind of discussion over that. You have some analysts, some people in the IDF, some people in the Ministry of Defense discussing that. But gradually, no one has a grasp of what, uh, the future holds about this. It depends on how the war continues.
It depends on Israel not making too many mistakes, not killing too many civilians. And it depends on public opinion, both in the US and And in the Arab world, can we [00:39:00] somewhere, somehow get to a point in which the Americans support a future solution for Gaza? The Americans are invested, the Saudis are invested, the UAE is willing to send soldiers or something like that.
We're a long way from getting there yet. But I think that Israel needs to be more aware of the possible consequences. For instance, the whole discussion of humanitarian aid for Israelis. We don't want to hear about this right now. Gallant's, um, the defense minister, responds, I remember talking to him three days after the war started.
He said, we're cutting off everything. Let them get water from Egypt, let them, it's not our problem anymore. And I can sympathize with the sentiment, considering the shock of October 7th, but it's not, this is not reality, this is not how things work in international affairs. And I think that even now, after more than a month and a half of fighting, Israel needs to be more aware of international reaction because it's not only a battle of [00:40:00] legitimacy.
It's about the realistic, uh, goals of the war. If you want to achieve them, you need the United States on your side. You need the munition. We need, uh, uh, uh, firepower. And in the end, we can't fight this alone. The fact that President Biden sent, deployed, uh, those, uh, aircraft carriers and so on helped us.
The terror is by light Iran, but we need their help for Gaza as well in the long run, and we cannot afford to fight with Biden with the president. Um, regarding this in the long term, there needs to be some kind of agreement between Israel and the United States of how we see this. Twin objectives of the war, repeatedly articulated by the, by the war cabinet, is eradicate Hamas and return all the hostages.
I've always, in many of my interviews, I, I frame questions with Israelis. Are those two goals in conflict with one another or do they [00:41:00] reinforce one another? I think they conflict, um, I think Galant and, uh, Heltia Levy and the generals will tell you, yes, it's the same thing. If we apply pressure, then Hamas would cave in, and if we apply more pressure, then Sinewall would be willing to release the hostages.
I'm not sure that it works that way. And think of the fact that we had to go into Gaza and continue, uh, and we couldn't get a deal yet. Now, it's a certain window of opportunity in which, uh, perhaps we can persuade Hamas under pressure, of course, to release 50 hostages. But there are still around 180 more.
I'm not sure how many of them are, are still alive. What do you do with the rest? For Sinuol, up to a certain point, uh, there is insurance policy, there is a human shield, if you'd like. I'm sure that he's very, very careful about not showing up above ground. And if he does Anything near a place where he thinks he can be hit by Israelis.
I'm sure [00:42:00] that he's forcing those hostages to be around him and serve as a human shield. So how do you solve this matter? Some people are saying like Beirut in 82, Arafat didn't have hostages, but other extreme pressure for the Israelis and other, the threat of the occupation of West Beirut as well, and that the siege Arafat in the end, that his goons left, uh, uh, Beirut by ship to Tunisia.
Is this the case with a terrorist? Like. Uh, meanwhile, again, somebody sees himself in religious terms, ideological terms as a new Salah ad Din. I doubt it. I very much hope that this would be the case in the end, that we could reach a deal in which he would release our hostages, go somewhere else, and hopefully somebody would, uh, take care of him not living to, uh, to see old age and raising grandkids.
But is this possible? Is this plausible? I doubt it right now. I think that what we may find What's happening is massive Israeli ground incursion [00:43:00] into the southern Gaza Strip, massive fighting, hopefully a defeat for Hamas, but I'm not sure that this would be done without the cost of more, uh, hostage lives.
I know you got to run, but just one final question. If Israel can't meet these objectives, if it's not going to get all the hostages back, if it can't totally eradicate Hamas, what What could be considered a win out of this for Israel? Unfortunately, I don't think that we can absolutely win this in the end.
Uh, think of what happened again, October 7th. Think of how it tore the country apart. Think of the efforts, um, the efforts I'm part of. I grew up on these principles and you follow them as an Israeli supporting American, uh, Jew. Um, that the IDF is always there, that we're always there to protect our people, that we'll pay any price, uh, to save their lives, and if necessary, you know, go in like Antebbe, or make a very debatable, [00:44:00] uh, prisoner swap deal like Gilad Shalit.
But in the end, Kor Yisrael Aravim Zedesed. Every one of us needs to do everything to save the others. The IDF did not show up on October 7th. This is a terrible ordeal. It's not only a personal ordeal, it was drama, a tragedy. This is something else. This is bigger than that. It's the, the whole efforts of the country was shattered.
And I think that it will take a lot of time for us to recover. And even if we, and hopefully we'll defeat Hamas, and my personal hope is that we'll see all of those terrorists who were involved in, in, in this slaughter, in this massacre, pay the ultimate price. I, I, I hope, I really do hope that the IDF would kill them all.
Including Singhal, including, uh, Alvarez and the Hamas leadership in Gaza, perhaps, uh, Hamas leaders in, in, in, um, outside of the country, outside of, uh, uh, Palestinian areas as well. But would that mean that we actually won the war? I think that this is problematic. And remember, for years and years and years, we were talking of [00:45:00] deterrence, which is quite a vague concept, strategic concept.
That we were stronger than our enemies, that they feared us, that they knew that if they did, if they made the wrong step, they took the wrong step. Israel would retaliate in a massive way. Okay, we did all this right now. Are we happy? Do we feel victorious? Do we feel that this is over yet? No, and I don't think that even if, um, Hamas is destroyed and Sinwal is executed or killed or whatever.
I don't think that we will find, um, you know, some, um, um, that we will find this as, uh, as a final victory. I think that this would, we will live through this tragedy for a long time. We need to survive somehow in this region and we need to be stronger and tougher. And there are a lot of, uh, conclusions from that regarding the IDF, our strategic behavior in the region at large, our relationship with the United States, all of that.
But I don't think that victory is, is, is, uh, right now a decisive victory is in the cards. It's much more complicated than that. We can try to improve [00:46:00] our situation and hopefully we would inflict a lot of damage on the other side. But that's not the end of the story. I'm not talking in terms of victory.
And I'm sad to say this, but this is the reality. Almost, I, I wanted a, uh, a dose of reality. Uh. In this conversation, you certainly gave it to us, uh, so I'm, um, grateful for your time virtually. I normally get it in person, but I'm grateful for it, uh, for this virtual conversation and, uh, hopefully we'll have you back on.
I know you're super busy and your schedule is under enormous, uh, demands these days. I will, um, I will, but I will track you down for another episode or in person when I'm next in Israel. In the meantime, thank you. Thank you.
That's our show for today. To keep up with Amos Harel's work, the easiest thing to do is to just follow him at haaretz. com. And I [00:47:00] recommend both of his books, The Seventh War and Thirty Four Days. But I think Thirty Four Days is especially relevant reading in this current crisis. Call Me Back is produced by Ilan Benatar.
Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.