The Ground Operation Begins/End of hostage negotiations? — with Avi Issacharoff
Avi Issacharoff returns for an urgent update on overnight developments and their implications. Avi has been an analyst and journalist for The Times of Israel, Walla, and Haaretz. In these roles, he reported extensively on the inner workings and leaders of Hamas and other Palestinian factions in Gaza and the West Bank — Avi has extensive networks in the Israeli security services and the Palestinian Territories. He is also the co-creator and writer of the Netflix original series “Fauda”, and other television series for Netflix and Showtime. A fluent Arabic speaker, Avi was also the Middle East Affairs correspondent for Israeli Public Radio, covering the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the war in Iraq, and the Arab world between the years 2003-2006. In 2004, together with Haaretz’s Amos Harel, he authored the book "The Seventh War - How we won and why we lost the war with the Palestinians." In 2008, they co-wrote "34 Days - The Story of the Second Lebanon War”. Born in Jerusalem, he graduated cum laude from Ben Gurion University with a B.A. in Middle Eastern studies. He then earned his M.A. from Tel Aviv University on the same subject, also cum laude.
Transcript
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[00:00:00] That's the part of the system or part of the theory when you negotiate with a terrorist organization, so you cannot only offer carrots. You have to hold a big stick in your hand and try to aim for the head. And I think that this is what Israel is doing, meaning negotiating over the prisoners, but at the same time fighting Hamas.
It is Saturday, October 28th, morning in New York City, afternoon in Israel. This is now the third Shabbat since the October 7th war began. I am Uh, welcoming back to this podcast, my longtime friend, Avi Isikaroff, who is a very experienced journalist on military affairs, national security, the Arab world, and specifically the [00:01:00] Palestinian political community and terror community and terrorist infrastructure, both in Gaza and the West Bank.
And he's the co creator of Fauda, the hit TV show on Netflix and a bunch of other. Uh, a bunch of, a number of other television and film projects, all, many of which deal specifically with some of the issues that are actually eerily playing out now. Avi, thanks for being here. Hi, Dan. Thank you. So, Avi, let's just, uh, jump right into it.
What, what do we know? Just can you provide a snapshot of what we know has been happening over the last 18 hours in Israel? So, since yesterday at 5. 30 PM, uh, the Israeli Ground forces started with a kind of a limited incursion into the northern part of, uh, Gaza Strip, especially the areas of Lahya. This is not the first time that our forces are spending some time in these [00:02:00] territories.
It happened before in the former decade, but even since 2006, we've been there a few times. But it hadn't happened since 2014. And now it seems that, uh, the Israeli army is back there inside Gaza Strip, it held all kinds of positions. So Avi, so in 2014, Operation Protective Edge, which was the last time Israel was heavily on the ground in Gaza, not just going from the air, that those are the communities that Israel's in back in 2014?
More or less, yes. This is the same area as more or less that Israel got in, this time only to the northern part of the Gaza Strip, Beth Hanun as far as I understand. And he took some positions for tanks, for artillery, just to kind of, uh, front positions. And from there they will have, uh, better options to go and attack Hamas targets.
And they are attacking Hamas targets. I mean, since yesterday evening or afternoon, we hear about [00:03:00] heavy bombarding of, uh, the Gaza Strip, heavier than before. We hear about the cut of all the connection lines for the phones and, um, internet from Gaza Strip. There are losses. It's pretty obvious that there are some losses among civilians, but also of course, among Hamas, we heard today, the Israeli Shin Bet saying that a few of the commanders of Hamas military wing were also killed in those, uh, attacks, and I guess that we are still trying to understand what's the next phase, um, our minister of defense, the Afghans spoke, uh, an hour ago saying that this is only the first part, of course, of, uh.
The ground operation. So we don't really know what to expect next. I guess that slowly, slowly, we will see the Israeli army moving down South towards Gaza city, which is pretty close to, to bet Hanon is someone who's been there quite many times in the past, it's not that far. Uh, so if the Israeli army wants to do it, [00:04:00] they will do it.
But the question is of course, about casualties from both sides. And, leading up to yesterday, I want to ask you about two, two different work streams, if you will. Uh, one work stream was trying to get the hostages out. So, what, what about yesterday's invasion do we know about the process on the hostages?
And the second is The effectiveness of all the bombing that Israel was doing from the air over the last three weeks in terms of creating a, uh, um, uh, relatively better environment when Israel goes in now. So first, let's, I want to hit both those questions. So first question, what do we know about the hostage negotiations that appear to have, Broken down or were never actually serious in the first place that led to this decision because it seems to me that this decision means I think Negotiations for hostage release are over.
Not really. Not really I think that this is [00:05:00] part of the negotiations meaning Israel understood that Hamas is stalling time and Hamas is not Ready to release, you know, the women the children the babies we're talking about nine months old baby Kfir, that's his name that has been held by Hamas So one would think that even Hamas has the interest to release them.
So right now Hamas is holding those hostages and hoping that it would slow down the Israelis from going into Gaza. So this is what the Israelis understood, and this is what led to the decision to go and to start at least the incursion, hoping that that will push Hamas to go for faster negotiations over the release of the hostages.
So it's not that the negotiations are stopped, not at all. It just means that there's another stage here that Israel is trying to overcome. Not stalling anymore, but [00:06:00] listen, Hamas, if you're not going to negotiate, So the next thing that you will see is our tanks in, inside Gaza City. So trying to negotiate, I guess, from a stronger position than they were in.
Exactly, exactly. And, and, go ahead. Well, you know, that's the part of the system or part of the theory when you negotiate with a terrorist organization. So you cannot only offer carrots. You have to hold a big stick in your head, hand. And try to aim for the head. And I think that this is what Israel is doing, meaning negotiating over the prisoners, but at the same time fighting Hamas now, Hamas is probably holding them, you know, deep down in the tunnels, in the Metro system of Gaza Strip.
Yesterday, the IDF spokesperson, um. It gave or published some information about the location of the head compound or the headquarters of Hamas, [00:07:00] which is just underneath Shifa Hospital. Shifa Hospital is the biggest hospital in Gaza City, the biggest hospital in Gaza Strip. Thousands of people are located over there and just underneath this hospital, this is where Hamas quarter.
It's not a big secret, by the way, we know that the Hamas military headquarters is where their senior leadership is where they do their planning is underneath this medical facility. Exactly. It's not only the military commanders, it's also the political leaders of Hamas, all of them hiding over there, according again, the Israeli army.
And it's not a big secret. I mean, every kid in Gaza knows that every kid in Gaza knows that Hamas is using those Hospitals as just a kind of a bunker for the leaders. There are a few entrances. There are a few other exits that a few people know about. And at the end, they're using a sick people, injured people [00:08:00] as human shield.
Simple as that. Now, even us in Fauda, if you remember in the third season, that's dealt a lot with, uh, Gaza, we portrayed it in Fauda third season that the headquarters are located. Okay, so that's really interesting because the commentary in the Israeli Hebrew language press last night, I was struck by a lot of it was focused on the decision now to launch the ground invasion meant an end to the hostage negotiations.
That was the interpretation, at least last night. And like on channel 12. in Israel. So a lot of people were making, you know, people were making this point and that this was a sea change in Israeli policy, that Israeli policy up to this point had all had been, Israel would go to the ends of the earth to get one hostage back.
And by launching this ground invasion, Israel was not only giving up on that policy, but it was giving up on that policy at the time that there were hundreds of hostages. And [00:09:00] that was, That, that, that was a new world for Israel. And you're saying not exactly, this actually just may be the next chapter, if you will, this is the ground invasion is the next chapter in hostage negotiations.
I believe so. I think that again, while you're negotiating with a terrorist organization, one has to keep in mind that you have to keep a few options open. You cannot just talk to them and talk and talk and talk while it's pretty, it's pretty obvious. And clear to everyone that they was trying to stall, um, and try to prevent the Israelis from going to a ground incursion.
Now the Israelis are saying, okay, let's use the other way, meaning let's go for a ground incursion. Maybe that will fasten or put some speed into Hamas leaders to get into some kind of an agreement over the release of the women, the kids, in exchange for some women prisoners, Palestinian women prisoners in the [00:10:00] Israeli jail.
So, we're still waiting to see what will happen with that, but it's pretty obvious, to me at least, that the negotiations are not over. And, you know, even if you will hear that the negotiations are done, over, that's it, it's never done over when it gets to hostages. Do you, and I'm not going to ask you to forecast with any specificity, but at least this initial expansion of operations, do you, how do you think about the potential for Israeli Military casualties now because that is always the risk.
Obviously, that was the risk then and and, you know, in 2014. So here we are again. Is this are you saying this step is, of course, there will there's likelihood of some Israeli casualties, but it's not the meat grinder. They're not in the meat grinder part of Gaza yet where you could get a massive number of Israeli military casualties.
So it's pretty obvious that the first stage didn't [00:11:00] bring any, thank God, uh, any casualties on the Israeli side till now, or only the first few hours, of course, but taking over some territory inside Gaza ended up with the killing of the terrorists, but, uh, thank God again, no casualties on the Israeli side, but it's, it's, it's clear that, you know, if we will go deeper and deeper into the Gaza Strip, into the Gaza City, Yes, there will be casualties, but we have to keep in mind, Dan, that, you know, one of the strategies of Hamas is dependent upon the fear.
And this is how they described the fear among the Israelis from loss of human, uh, of human life, from the loss of soldiers. This is the strategy that really leads them. Meaning I saw some exchange of, uh, messages between Hamas and the, the friends outside of Hamas. And it seems like they're very much. Sure, uh, that the Israeli army doesn't have the courage [00:12:00] to commit such kind of a ground invasion to go forward with the ground invasion.
Why? Because of the fear from casualties among the IDF soldiers. So I think that we have to break this conception. Inside Hamas's hearts and the minute that Hamas will understand that the Israelis do mean business and they're not going to play like in between, we don't want to like, no, we're heading towards Gaza city and bringing down your government, your organization.
I think that you will hear a change in their policy regarding the hostages and even regarding the, the, the future of Gaza Strip. Yitzhak Rabin had a famous line in the 90s, it went something like, we'll, we'll, we'll fight terrorist attacks and we'll fight the Intifada as though there's no peace process and we'll pursue the peace process as though there are no terrorists and no peace talks, which was a, which was a formulation based on one from, you know, pre state years, which is we'll, we'll, you know, we'll fight the [00:13:00] British, we'll work with the British as though there's no white paper and it was a similar formulation.
So basically what you're saying now is they're going to. Israel's going to fight Hamas as though, I think, there are no hostage negotiations, but they're going to be open to pursuing continued hostage negotiations as though, as if there's no ground operation. Like, that's basically what you're saying. But it's never worked in the past.
That's the thing. I mean, we understand that we are in a kind of a dead end regarding at least the hostages. But at least that the thought is that, you know, by putting the sword over the, the neck of these people might bring them to agree for the release of hostages. Okay. And then I, I do want to move on to some other topics, but do you think what Israel did over the last three weeks?
I've had two interpretations of what's happened over the last three weeks. One interpretation was Israel was caught, was 7th [00:14:00] and they. lost to some degree some confidence in their, in their understanding of the threat from Gaza, the threat from Hamas, the landscape there, the battlefield, et cetera. There was an intelligence breakdown as we saw glaringly on October 7th, and it's given them pause on how they go into Gaza.
And that's why there's been this long delay. In the ground operation, because they're trying to understand what they know and what they don't know. The other interpretation is, Israel does, Israeli leadership, the war cabinet, does have a pretty good sense of what's in Gaza. And what they've been doing over the last three weeks, in addition to negotiating for hostages, is doing a lot of damage from the air that will prep the landscape for what we're seeing now.
It'll make what they're doing, what Israel's doing now, easier. Easier, you know, I'm choosing that word. Relatively, of course, but, but less challenging because they could do so much damage to the infrastructure of North Gaza, getting rid of booby traps, taking down buildings with snipers, uh, et cetera, et cetera.
So which of [00:15:00] those interpretations are you more in agreement with? I don't think that there's any contradiction between the two. I believe that the two of them and a bit more of the political considerations also is also part of this. Meaning. Of course, uh, part of it was, uh, the kind of a crisis or disbelief among the decision makers from the political leadership in the military leadership, in the army and the Shin Bet.
So the leaders or the politicians wanted to understand better and to consider all the different options that we're facing in Gaza after they understood that there are no good Options in Gaza. So I think that this is the one that led them to the decision. Okay. We will go to a ground operation, but then you need the preparation, the proper preparation on the Israeli side for equipment, for training, the souls, et cetera.
And then, of [00:16:00] course, bombing Gaza. Meaning bombing tunnels, bombing, um, houses that you think that might be booby trapped. Uh, bombing each and every facility that might have, uh, some people, Hamas terrorists, that are able to attack our forces in Gaza while they enter. So all this led to the decision to hold on and to wait for three weeks almost.
And at the end What we do also need to keep in mind is the political consideration, meaning Netanyahu is very not much known of someone who dislike military operations, especially ground operation. He knows that there are no winners in wars. He knows that the first one to pay is basically the prime minister or the leader of the other side in a war like this.
And he knows that casualties do not serve any politician, especially in the Israeli people, among the Israeli people. So I think that, you know, Netanyahu [00:17:00] is a kind of a very careful man or kind of a very hesitating even leader concerning the execution of a military ground operation. This is part of the reason that we saw that he took the army.
Almost three weeks. In the last week, we were witnessing then a real exchange of accusations, meaning the military leadership, someone among the military officials. It was leaked to the press that the reason for the ground operation not to start is actually the prime minister. And it was all over the press and it was a kind of a discussion here in the media of how come, what's going on?
Why does the prime minister not interested in a, in a ground invasion? So it led to some kind of a discourse in the media till of course, uh, yesterday that it was, uh, clear that the Israeli. A [00:18:00] cabinet in the province that gave the green light. Is there any further thought, either in your mind or the people you are talking to, either in the Israeli press, your colleagues who cover this closely, or in the Israeli security apparatus that you talk to, is there any clearer sense from Israel's perspective about who could or would succeed Hamas in a post Gaza Hamas?
So I think that I'll start with Hamas. Because, you know, there's always an option that there won't be a day after Hamas and Hamas will stay in power. And if you ask Hamas, of course, they're going to win this war and they are going to stay in power in Gaza, stronger than ever, you know, again, if you hear what is the public opinion right now in among the Palestinians, not in Gaza, but especially in the [00:19:00] West bank, you'd understand why are they so, um, sure of The self confidence is in the sky somewhere.
I think that also their popularity among Palestinians, especially in the West Bank is somewhere in between the sun and the moon it's over there. It's really top, top, top popularity ever for Hamas among Palestinians. Less in Gaza, by the way. Why? Because you know, when 800, 000 Palestinians needed to leave their houses and most of them will go back to.
Uh, demolished house. So, of course, some are questioning Hamas's interest. And at the end of the day, Hamas leaders are hiding in the bunkers and the tunnels underneath Gaza, while the people, the civilians, are the ones that are getting killed. And this is what Hamas wanted from the very first day that, you know, their civilians would be killed and they will survive.
So, there's always an option, A, that Hamas is going to stay in power. For [00:20:00] Israel, it's the worst option. We understand today that although for years we thought that that's the less worst option, we understand today that it's the worst ever. Now, the other option is, uh, I would say that the more leading one is to consider some kind of returning of the Palestinian Authority to rule Gaza Strip.
Some way or the other. Now, that has, of course, some advantages and some very Just Avi, just for our, for our listeners. So, when you, just, I want to make sure everyone understands this. So, the Palestinian Authority is in control of the West Bank. That is the quote unquote government, the political entity of Mahmoud Abbas or otherwise known as Abu Mazen.
They were in control of the West Bank and Gaza. They got pushed out of Gaza in 2007 by Hamas, basically staged a coup. So, they pushed, they pushed Palestinian Authority out. So the Palestinian Authority is only in charge of the West Bank. The Palestinian Authority works closely with the Israeli government and its security forces work [00:21:00] closely with the Israeli government, which Avi has written extensively about both, uh, in his journalism, but also that's captured quite extensively in, in, in the number of the Fauda episodes, uh, seasons.
First of all, just, I want to stay on this. Do you think Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority are quietly, underscore quietly, pleased with what's happening right now? That Hamas is under so much pressure in Gaza because it means that the Palestinian Authority can reassert, potentially, its authority in Gaza?
I don't think that they are pleased to see what's happening to their people, you know, that so many dead people. And so many people that will have no future right now and Gaza is on flames. And at the end of the day, when Gaza is suffering so much, it brings more popularity and support to Hamas, not to the Palestinian Authority that is portrayed as a group of collaborators and traitors, [00:22:00] honestly.
Now, having said that, the Palestinian Authority does understand that it is a kind of an alternative to what's going on in Gaza today. And there were some talks, and this is what I published this week in YNet and Yediot HaFaronot. There were some talks between the American administration and Mahmoud Abbas about the option of the PA returning back to Gaza the day after.
Abbas said, listen, I'm not going to go back over a tank, over an Israeli tank back to Gaza Strip. I'm willing to consider this, but only in exchange of some political process, peace process. He wants Netanyahu to say that Gaza and the West Bank will be part of a Palestinian state. And the American officials who spoke to him said immediately, Listen, this is something that Netanyahu cannot give you.
Because of his coalition, because of his government, which is [00:23:00] right wing, and he said, okay, that's his own problem. So we are stuck over there because all kinds of considerations, part of them are political and part of them over the future of our prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. So he's totally terrified from the option of negotiating with the Palestinian Authority over peace.
Now, the third option is that the Israeli army will go to Gaza and wipe out Hamas. And then get out and leave it in chaos. So that's, of course, also a very bad alternative, maybe one of the worst. Why? Because we understand that, you know, if you have a vacuum, something steps into this vacuum and usually in poor places like Gaza, you would find even more radical organizations than Hamas stepping in.
So this is not a good option. Definitely not even, um, bad. This is really one of the worst. Another option that is being now mentioned in the [00:24:00] media and among scholars is some kind of a combination of head of tribes, like sheiks, like whatever, with some support of international community, and maybe bringing back some Palestinian figures from outside, like Mohammed Ahlan, like Salam Fayyad.
I don't think that it's, it's, um, there's enough understanding of what does it mean this last idea. So I do not, I'm not sure that there's something that we can really say if it's good or bad. I don't think that. You know, a kind of a tribal regime will be managing Gaza's issues the day after. I don't think that it will survive.
The West Bank, which I know you've, you've spent a lot of time in the West Bank seems to be heating up right now too. What can you tell us about what's happening there? Is the IDF, I guess, capable of dealing with both fronts, not to mention the Northern front, which I want to talk to you in a minute about, cause I know you were just up there, but what's happening in the West Bank and how [00:25:00] worried is the IDF?
about what's happening there. I must say that I'm not, but this is personally me. I'm not in panic. And some people are very much afraid of what's going on in the West Bank. I think that, you know, yesterday evening we saw some demonstrations taking place in a few cities, in a few Palestinian cities. But at the end of the day, you don't see the tens of thousands of people going there to the streets and studying a kind of a third intifada.
Thank God, again, thank God, Baruch Hashem, it didn't happen. Um, I'm not saying that it cannot happen, but I'm saying that the public in the West Bank, the Palestinian public in the West Bank is not that fast about, you know, going and studying a war. They know what the price can be. They remember the price of 2002.
When the Israeli army went into this ground incursion into the West [00:26:00] Bank cities, took over all of them and cleaned almost the streets from the terrorists. It was a very heavy price for all Palestinians living in the West Bank. And I'm not sure that most of the Palestinians are interested in that. So this is why it's very nice to cheer and to clap hands for Hamas in Gaza Strip.
But there's another level where you go on a struggle and maybe even shoot the Israeli side. So we're not there. And, uh, good news, till today, and then again, till that moment at least, thank God, is that, uh, the Arab, the Israeli Arabs, the Israeli, the Arab citizens of Israel are also, uh, quiet, and if, to be honest, they paid a very heavy price.
in Hamas's attack. Meaning, Hamas didn't kill only Jews. Hamas killed 1, 400 people, but 24 of them were Arab Muslims. Some of them were wearing even Islamic [00:27:00] dresses, like women that had hijab on their heads, and girls that had hijab on their heads, and they executed even them. So 24 Muslim Arabs Israelis are dead.
Six are still missing or in captivity in, in Gaza. So, so Avi, you're, you're just, just, just sorry. Let's just understand. So there's a, a, a, a large minority in Israel of Arab Muslim citizens of Israel. And they've often been very critical of Israeli government policy. And they've been very sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.
And I think what you're saying is Hamas, when they came into Southern Israel, they killed a large number of those. Arab Muslim citizens of Israel, and therefore, the Arab Muslim population in Israel is not exactly sympathetic to what Hamas is doing right now. Relatively speaking, especially when we compare that to the escalation of May 2021, [00:28:00] that we saw thousands of Israeli Arabs demonstrating in the streets against Israel and going into very violent clashes.
Relatively speaking, we are witnessing a very calm era between the Israeli Arabs and the Jewish Israelis living here in Israel, and the opposite. We see solidarity, we see joint activities. I think that many of them did understand that what Hamas did was a massacre, was terrible. They went on, you know On the, they went to do those atrocities that even today, three weeks after every day, I swear, Dan, every day I hear craziest news stories about the atrocities that they committed in Gaza's periphery.
It's unbelievable what happened to this organization, what happened to Palestinians who joined them. I'm talking about civilians in Gaza that joined [00:29:00] Hamas's troops and massacred and raped and cut the heads of people. And yes, that was a terrible massacre, and I think that many Arab Israelis understand that today.
Okay, you were just up north in recent days. What were you doing up there, and what is your sense of things up there? So, um, I was just, uh, playing the journalist, in a way, and I went to speak also to a battalion, um, of Miluim, of reserves, um, men on the edge of, uh, between twenty 122 and 50 years old, even plus men, just like me and younger, most of them are younger, but with the families, with the wives, those kids, and they've left home.
And for three weeks, they're out there in the North waiting for, you know, if God forbids there will be a war against Hezbollah. And again, every day that passes, we see, we [00:30:00] hear about those, uh, missiles that are being shot from a Lebanese territory towards Israel, rockets that are being shot. We understand that Hezbollah is playing a very dangerous game on the border, meaning they don't, Hezbollah doesn't want to portray himself as someone who forgot.
The Palestinian cause who forgot his brother, so called to the Muqawama, the resistance. So this is a kind of, uh, so called lip service, meaning here you, you see, we are part of it. And you know what the thing that struck me a few days ago is that usually when Hezbollah have, uh, has casualties in wars against Israel, in some terrorist attacks against Israel, he won't publish.
He will never publish. That he has casualties or, God forbids, had the names or the photos of the, of his people that were killed. And suddenly the few, in the last few days, you see that they're publishing again [00:31:00] and again, the name, the photo, this man died here, this man died there. So that the message was actually, look.
Look, our fellow Palestinians, our brothers in Gaza, look, 43 or 44 of our people died in fighting against the Israelis. So they want to show that they're part of this war, but they're keeping the body outside the water. Let's, let's put it that way. Meaning they're only with the lower side of the leg, the lower part of the leg in the water, but not more than that.
They don't want to jump into the swimming pool that is called a war against Israel.
Okay, Avi, before we let you go, I just want to, and obviously we'll have you on, uh, plenty over the next, uh, you know, couple weeks, hopefully, this war does not go on indefinitely, but I just wanted to ask you just a quick snapshot, because you always have your finger on the pulse every time I talk to you with work, where your sense of Israeli [00:32:00] society is at, and I'd say over the last two or three decades, it has felt to me that most of Israeli society has been operating on more of a Western cultural priority list, which goes something like this.
Economic quality of life, economic prosperity, prosperity, high standard of living is what's most important. And. Obviously, we have to worry about national security and homeland security and personal security, but it, I don't want to say it was subordinated to economic life and quality of life, but it was, it was just sort of, it was hovering in the background, but it wasn't what everybody was focused on.
Do you think that October 7th is, is flipping that? Like, I'm just trying to get a sense from you of what the impact of October 7th is having on how Israelis think about their lives and about society and about how they live their lives and, and what it means to live in Israel and what the priorities are.[00:33:00]
I will need your help here with, uh, a word in Hebrew that I don't know how to translate it. You know, usually we do it. Before Yom Kippur, during Yom Kippur, you know, where did we go wrong? What did we do wrong? Where were our mistakes? So it's a kind of a search in your soul and your brain of, you know, the things that went wrong.
And I think that, first of all, after the war, there will be a very long process of cheshbon nefesh, of people checking out themselves, but also their society, the people around them. And what happened here, what on earth happened here, especially in the last 10 months since Netanyahu won the elections and the huge crisis that was made inside Israel society, the, this fragility, this kind of a [00:34:00] huge gap that was created between secular and Orthodox Between Mizrahi and Ashkenazi, between left and right.
That was the thing that killed us then. This is the real thing that killed us, and everyone, including me, were warning Netanyahu of the price that we will pay for this crisis that he's done through this legislation, that he tore this state apart, that he tore this people apart. And I think that this is the first thing that we will need to do.
And how can we unite these people? And I'm not saying it in a invent things. Listen, two months after this legislation coup started, I was speaking in front of 140, 000 people in Kaplan in the center of Tel Aviv. And over there I stood and I said to Mr. Netanyahu, our prime minister, you can be the best [00:35:00] prime minister.
If you will stop it now and stop the tour of the people of Israel. You don't need to do that because, and I said it because. Our enemies in Hamas, in Hezbollah, in Iran are smelling the blood in the water. And he didn't stop and he continued and he continued and he continued to do that. So this is the first part of what we will need to do as a society to ask ourselves and how can we unite again and fight our enemies and about our priorities.
You know, you've wrote a very famous book in Israel and all over the world. It's called Startup Nation. I think that you will have another book. Uh, that I can only offer another name, uh, restart nation, because we will need to restart everything, whether it's the IDF and the intelligence and the government offices and the prime minister's offices and [00:36:00] especially the society, especially that this rift, this crisis that has been made between all segments of the Israeli society over there, we will need to restart.
And to think how can we do it better, and together. Okay, Avi, we will leave it there. Uh, I, uh, I will be calling on you, no doubt, in the days ahead. I know you, you, uh, made this happen last minute, and you're, and you're on the move, uh, this afternoon, Israel time. So I, uh, I, anyways, as always, I'm grateful for your time, and your insight, and your friendship.
Stay safe. Thank you very much, Dan.[00:37:00]