The Death of Deif – A turning point? With Ronen Bergman
Who is Mohammed Deif?
Why does he matter (or why did he matter?)
Is he dead?
We have often said on this podcast that Hamas long ago transformed from a ragtag militia to the equivalent of a light infantry army of a sovereign state. The architect of that transformation was Mohammed Deif. If Hamas was a terror army, its commanding general or army chief of staff was Mohammed Deif. The second intifada? Deif was central to its planning and execution. Its tunnel system and rocket arsenal? All that, too, was Deif. And October 7th? Mohammed Deif.
Israel had been on the hunt for Deif long before October 7th. In fact, he had escaped at least seven assassination attempts going back to 2001.
Today he is most likely dead, based on an extraordinary intelligence and military operation that took place on Saturday morning.
To help us understand what Hamas is, today, without Mohammed Deif, and what it means for Israel’s war against Hamas – and for the hostage and ceasefire negotiations – we are joined by Ronen Bergman, who is a staff writer for The New York Times Magazine and Senior Correspondent for Military and Intelligence Affairs for Yedioth Ahronoth, an Israeli daily. Ronen recently won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on this war and the pre-war intelligence failures.
He has published numerous books —including “Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations,” and also “The Secret War with Iran."
Ronen is also a member of the Israeli bar (he clerked in the Attorney General’s Office), and has a master’s degree in international relations and a Ph.D. in history from Cambridge University.
Full Transcript
DISCLAIMER: THIS TRANSCRIPT HAS BEEN CREATED USING AI TECHNOLOGY AND MAY NOT REFLECT 100% ACCURACY.
RB: If this proves to be correct, that Mohammed Deif was killed, then this is the one most important singular military, but especially intelligence achievement since the beginning of the war. In a way, it's sort of re-institutionalized of their strength and their power that were so badly damaged after the failure of October 7.
DS: It's 11:30 PM on Sunday, July 14th here in New York City. It's 6:30 AM on Monday, July 15th in Israel, as Israelis are starting their day. According to Haaretz Newspapers, Anshel Pfeffer, who's been a guest on this podcast several times, Mohammed Deif is, quote, ‘responsible for the death of the highest number of Israelis. He is also directly responsible for the greatest suffering of the Palestinian people since the Nakba of 1948.’ Close quote. For more than three decades, Deif commanded Hamas's military wing in Gaza. He also supervised terror operations in the West Bank during some of that time. I've often said in previous episodes of this podcast that Hamas long ago transformed from a ragtag militia to the equivalent of a light infantry army of a sovereign state. The architect of that transformation was Mohammed Deif. If Hamas was a terror army, its commanding general, or its army chief of staff, was Mohammed Deif. The Second Intifada, during which over a thousand Israelis were slaughtered in the early 2000s, well, Mohammed Deif was central to its planning and its execution. Hamas rocket arsenal grew larger than that of most countries since Hamas' full takeover of Gaza in 2007. And its labyrinth of tunnels below the ground in Gaza grew larger than most subway systems in large cities across the West. All that, too, was Mohammed Deif. A military arsenal spread out inside and underneath schools, mosques, hospitals, and UN facilities in Gaza. It was a complex system designed and implemented under the leadership of Mohammed Deif. And October 7th, Mohammed Deif. Israel had been on the hunt for death long before October 7th. In fact, he had escaped at least seven assassination attempts going back to 2001 that we know of, which is also partly why he had a mythical status in the eyes of most Palestinians. And yet today, he is indeed, most likely, dead as a result of an extraordinary intelligence and military operation that took place by Israel this past Saturday morning. To help us understand what Hamas is today, without Mohammed Deif and what it means for Israel's war against Hamas and for the hostage and ceasefire negotiations that are ongoing, we are joined by Ronen Bergman who returns to the podcast. Ronen is a staff writer for the New York Times Magazine, and he's a senior correspondent for military and intelligence affairs for Yedioth Ahronoth, an Israeli daily Ronen recently won a Pulitzer Prize for his reporting on this war and his and the pre war intelligence failures. He has published numerous books, including Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel's Targeted Assassinations, and also The Secret War with Iran. Ronen is also a member of the Israeli Bar. He clerked in the Attorney General's office, and he has a master's degree in international relations and a PHD in history from Cambridge University. Ronen Bergman, on The Death of Deif: A Turning Point? This is Call Me Back. I'm pleased to welcome back to this podcast my friend Ronen Bergman from Yedioth Ahronoth, from the New York Times Magazine, and a New York Times best selling author. Ronen, thanks for being here.
RB: Hi Dan, pleasure to be here again.
DS: Last time we were together, we were in your home in Ramat Hasharon, sitting in your kitchen, talking into late hours of the night. Uh, and here we are back, unfortunately for me, virtually. I'm not in Tel Aviv or just outside of Tel Aviv, but we needed to get a hold of you.
And we are grateful that you called us back given events of the last 48 hours. I want to jump right into it. Uh, you are as plugged in as anyone with the intelligence community and the security apparatus in Israel. What do we know about the assassination of Mohammed Deif and whether or not it was successful?
RB: So by far, Mohammed Deif was the number one, most wanted on the Israeli list for Hamas military apparatus for years. Especially since October 7, which he mastermined, and Israel, on Saturday, at 29 minutes past 10, bombed a Hamas secure hideout, compound, nearby the Barasi, not far away, just by Khan Yunis.
DS: But just to be clear, it's a Hamas compound within what we, in the West, were calling the humanitarian zone, the safe zone for civilians. Within that safe zone, Hamas had built its own compound for members of its senior leadership.
RB: The commander of the Hamas Khan Yunis Brigade, the senior Hamas military commander in Khan Yunus. Rafa Salameh, remember that name, because we'll get back to it in a minute. He secured a compound, a perimeter, a real estate, losing other hideouts and safe houses because of the Israeli maneuver earlier this year. He secured a new hideout for him and his men, and this was secured and restricted from other people to enter throughout the time. And Israel, Israeli airplane, bombed that place where Salameh and Israel believed death had been above ground at that minute, at that specific minute, with massive tonnage of explosives, saying they had the best intelligence identification of Mohammed’s death at that specific location, at that specific minute. Bombing that, Israel believed that Hamas already basically confirmed the death of Salameh. And yet, waiting for final confirmation, but as we speak now, I just received a text from a high ranked military official who said we have more and more signs that Mohammed Deif is indeed dead and was killed in that bombing.
DS: And just so I understand, either you don't know the exact signs or you can't share the exact signs, but generally speaking, when intelligence says we have more signs, because I just assume that he was vaporized, we do know the size of the munition that was dropped on the compound, right?
RB: Uh, At least five massive bombs, among them bunker busters, so JDAMs, GBU, and we are talking about many tons of bombs, and on a very small area. The purpose was to make sure that if all the intelligence identifications are indeed correct, and he's there, then both of those, uh, in quotes, ‘gentlemen’ are not getting from that alive, so he may be vaporized.
DS: Vaporized. Right. So when they say we have more and more signs, if he's vaporized, what could more and more of those signs be? Could they be picking up intelligence intercepts of Hamas officials talking about the fact that he was there?
RB: It's mainly dependent on what Hamas is saying in the communication among themselves. But on the other guy, on Salameh There are reports that at least remains of his body that could be identified, and we are talking about, I did like, uh, external identification. It's not the DNA. They don't have the equipment there to do something like that. And Israel would not risk in sending any kind of ground force to actually pick up pieces for DNA for identification. So they did pick up some parts of the body of Salameh, and they are waiting for more to come. So, from all the officials I'm speaking with in different agencies and parts of the Israeli intelligence community and, and, and defense establishment, they all say the same. If we were right to identify the presence of Mohammed Deif by Rafa Salameh at that specific location, 10:29 AM on Saturday, Israel time, Gaza time, then there's no way he could get out of that location alive. And that Hamas will have an interest to keep the myth live a little longer because the myth of Mohammed Deif being bulletproof that phoenix rising from the ashes again and again and again, it was much stronger than, than Sinwar.
DS: Okay, I want to get to the myth of Deif in a moment. Before I do, I just have one other operational question. I have been told on one of my recent trips to Israel post October 7th by, let's just say, a very senior official in what was the war cabinet. He had said that in a previous attempt on Yahya Sinwar, this is well before October 7th, where they had Sinwar in their sights, an official had advocated for something like a 2,000 pound bomb to be dropped on Sinwar. It was overruled and they only dropped a 500 pound bomb and they did that because they're worried about civilian casualties. And as a result, Sinwar got away. And so one of the lessons from that experience is when an official advocates for a heavier munition when you have a top Hamas target in your sights, give the approval for the larger munition. And I'm just wondering, is that relevant here? Because it sounds like they went for a much larger munition.
RB: In 2003, Israeli intelligence thought they have everybody on sight because following continuous successes from Shin Bet, the spiritual leader and the founder and the political leader of Hamas, Ahmed Yassin, was calling for one big assembly of all the commanders in one place at one time, and they wanted to drop, it was a three stories house of some physician in Gaza, and they wanted to drop one ton bomb on the house and kill everybody. But following collateral damage of previous assassination attempt, they went and they only shoot one quarter of a ton missile into the third floor when they thought everybody are going to dine because they already brought the desserts and they closed the windows. And it hit exactly on the third floor. And people said nobody could get out of there alive. But they could not get the electric wheelchair of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin to the third floor. So they sat in the first floor and nobody was hurt. They only need to, you know, move the dust and started running. And someone from visual intelligence of Shin Bet told me even Sheikh Yassin stood up from his wheelchair and start running. And that was, I think, a lesson that everybody learned from that point on. That if you have a target, and if you are determined to kill the target, and if the target is senior enough, then you cannot, and if you are convinced that the intelligence is reliable enough, you cannot allow yourself to be in a position, like in previous attempts on Muhammad Deif himself. He lost an eye, he lost a leg, but if you attack, you attack with one purpose only. Someone told me, you cannot be half dead. It's either you kill or you don't. Half means nothing if you want to take out the target.
DS: Okay, so now let's talk about Mohammed Deif, who he is and his generation in Hamas, his generation of leadership.
RB: So Deif was, um, was born in the 60s. He was born in Khan Yunis. Together he grew up with now, he joined Hamas during the first Intifada, so in ‘88, shortly after Sinwar. Sinwar went to jail, but death remained in the Qassam military brigade of Hamas. And while he was born in Gaza in 1993, he moves to the West Bank and start building the military infrastructure over there. Then he comes back to Gaza and he replaces the person that was assassinated by Israel, Samuel Kodi Madaken, as the head of the military wing of Hamas. And in that title, since 1993, until at least yesterday, he was holding the longest term official of Hamas in that capacity, or for that sake, in any other capacity in the history of the organization. And, you know, I'm looking now at the top classifying resume of Deif. He was behind the abduction of Nachshon Wachsman in October 1994. A series of suicide bombing in buses in Jerusalem and in Ashkelon in 1996, and he was arrested by the Palestinian Authority in May 2000. But then he was released, or he fled, or was released from Palestinian prison later that year. And he was taking again the role of the military commander of Hamas after being wounded, going to Egypt for some kind of rehabilitation, coming back. He was the target of numerous assassination attempts. And unlike Sinwar, or other leaders of Hamas that were adapting their daily life according to the level of clash and confrontation with Israel. So if there is a ceasefire, they go out of their hideouts, like Sinwar. You know, Sinwar was seeing public and seeing people as the leader of Hamas.
DS: This is important for our listeners to understand, because Sinwar may not have been on the radar before October 7th. There were many periods over the last number of years Where you'd see Sinwar walking the streets, shaking hands like he was like a political leader, doing retail politics. He was in Hamas, Gaza media, seen among the people, giving speeches, showing up at mosques. I mean, he, he was a very visible public figure. And I think you're saying the contrast with Deif is Deif was invisible.
RB: Deif was a ghost. When Israeli intelligence raided Gaza in the last nine months, they found new pictures of Deif that were additional to one picture of him sitting on a small hill in Gaza with someone much younger. Looks, they look very friendly to each other, very close. And that someone is Rafa Salameh, the guy that was killed with him yesterday. And that was the only picture that they had for many, many years for him. Now they have more. Yes, just last week I saw new pictures of him from Gaza. There were rumors that he doesn't walk, that he cannot see. He lost an eye and he lost a leg. But he is in shape, and Israeli intelligence knew that though a ghost, and though very strict on his locations, not appearing in public, they knew who is the real commander of the military forces of Hamas, it was without doubt, with no question, it was Mohammed Deif. And Mohammed Deif pops up publicly only in rare moments. So, for example, after Hamas launched an attack on Jerusalem in May ‘21, suddenly you hear his voice. There is a recording. And October 7 morning, suddenly he releases a recording. Only recording, not video. So very timely, very rare, and always in the shadow. He is a ghost. He is a myth, and Hamas thought he's also bulletproof. Well, maybe not anymore.
DS: Okay, I just want to put a final point. We won't go through his entire history. Maybe we'll put something in the show note on it, of all the destruction and human catastrophe he was responsible for. But among them, he's got a long history going back in 1996. He was the primary planner of what became known as the Jaffa Road bombings, which killed 25 Israeli civilians, including two American students. And he was known for decades to have been plotting to kill Americans. It wasn't just Israelis. He wanted to kill Americans. And he was also responsible for military strategy in 2014. That was a war that some say was a harbinger of what was to come nine years later in which Hamas kidnapped and murdered three Israeli teenagers. The IDF responded in force. It was the last major IDF ground operation in Gaza until post October 7th.
RB: And after 2014, he sends a letter of apology to Qasem Soleimani, the head of the Quds, the Quds force of Iran on behalf of the Qasem Brigade and says, my brother Qasem, I am sorry we did not perform well. But it's not us, it's because of the politicians. So Haniyeh, the head of the political wing of Hamas, they did not let us attack first. And let me tell you on behalf of Sinwar and myself, next time We learned the lesson. First, we need the utmost total surprise attack against Israel, and we will not listen to the politicians anymore. Those two lessons were at the core of what happened on October 7.
DS: And Deif, in terms of his exact position, his exact position has been described to me as he was chief of staff, effectively, chief of staff of what you're calling the, the Qassam Brigade, which is the military wing of Hamas. So, That means he was the chief of staff of the Hamas military or paramilitary, whatever you want to call it. If we regard Hamas, the Hamas that Israel encountered on October 7th as a military of the equivalent of a light infantry military of a state, that's how it's organized. It's organized structurally that way with these 24 plus battalions, each one assigned to a geography. Each one has a hierarchy sitting atop that military command structure is Mohammed Deif. He is the chief of staff.
RB: He is the head, the supreme military commander of Hamas, which is subordinate to, theoretically, to a political entity, so like the government. But since Sinwar took over in 2016, they both came from the military. So it's like the military is controlling the military. There's no political wing, per se. And during little times, he was replaced by other people when he was under medical treatments. But he is, by far, the most important figure in the military terrorist history of Hamas.
DS: Okay, so assuming he's dead, which I believe he is, and it sounds like what you believe he is too, and assuming he was not only central to so much of the human catastrophe subjected to Israelis over the last number of decades, and obviously his, his central role in planning of October 7th, what does his death or what would his death mean for Hamas now?
RB: So, first of all, it has tactical, strategic, military, and symbolic effect. Because Israel believes Hamas will take its time to let the myth live longer, that it depends on when, if at all, Hamas will announce that he is dead. Like, it can take time, and they want to prolong that. Now, on the, the symbolic effect cannot be underestimated, because he was the military commander. He will not be there to actually command the forces. And the forces will know that there's no one above them to give them the instructions what to do now. And this is when much of the infrastructure is already destroyed. Many people are killed or ran away. This will have an effect. Will that convince Sinwar to surrender? If you read the psychological profile of Sinwar in Israeli intelligence, you will see it will maybe take him to the other end because force will usually take Sinwar to do the opposite.But, I don't think that it will have a strategic effect on what Sinwar decides to do next. And this will also, I think, I assume, will take us to the next question is the fate of the negotiation on the hostages.
DS: Before we get to that, I want to ask one other question. Can you just spend a moment on Rafa Salameh? Because they took him out too, it sounds like. It sounds like that they're 100% certain of, so.
RB:So, among of the five brigade commanders of Hamas, he is the third to be killed after Nofel and Ghandu. There are two left. If he is the chief of staff, then they are the supreme military council, except for Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas, his brother, Mohammed Sinwar, and Marwan Issa. Marwan Issa, the number three, is dead. And besides of taking Deif out, killing Salameh is very important, especially because he is centralizing the military effort of Hamas in Khan Yunus, which is a very important area where also SInwar is suspected to be hiding. This by itself is a very important success to Israeli intelligence. But not important enough for them, because they decided to wait until he joined to a conversation with Deif. Meaning they could take out Salameh before, but they preferred to wait for the chance that he is with Deif and only then bomb the, the vicinity.
DS: Okay. I got a series of questions then. First is who's likely to replace Deif.
RB: The person who was supposed to succeed him is Marwan Issa, but he's also dead. So the next one in the chain of command is Raed Saint, the head of strategic planning and operations for Hamas. You remember that in our previous meeting in my kitchen, we discussed Jericho wall, the wall plan of Hamas. So the right side is the person who actually wrote Jericho Wall under the command of death So he is the next one in command. He is presumed to be injured in an assassination attempt against him two weeks ago. If he is capable, then I saw he will be the next one. There's also a possibility that Mohammed Sinwar, the brother of Yahya, was a brigade commander, and now he is like the head of the tunnel network, may also take over. The problem is, how do they announce a successor if they do not confirm that he is dead? Like, it's like, I think that Hamas will also be in a tight spot here because they want to have an authority. But in order to have one, they need to do what they don't want, which is to announce Deif as a, as a Shaheed.
DS: Shaheed meaning a martyr.
RB: Yes.
DS: And the same is true in terms of how they respond, because if Hamas says, we're going to respond, you and I were speaking yesterday, we're speaking over the weekend, and you said, you know, they could respond by executing a hostage. But again, any kind of response that they make a statement about is a concession that Israel was successful.
RB: Not even by something more drastic, like saying we are stopping any negotiation on the hostage deal. And this was not done.
DS: Meaning, Hamas has not said, at least in the last, as we're recording this, they're freezing negotiations as a result of the Israeli operation because they're saying the Israeli operation was a failure.
RB: They even denied saying, they said, we did not sever the negotiation, we did not stop the negotiation. And in fact, there is a part of the negotiation on the lower level that is still taking place in Cairo. I assume that, let's say, theoretically, tomorrow they will announce Mohammed Deif shahid, so a martyr, so he's dead. They, I assume, they will sever, they will stop, the negotiation, but the interest remains the same. And if Hamas had the basic interest to reach a deal before Deif was killed, they will have the same interest to have a deal after he's killed. And that interest is a ceasefire is the end of the war is Israel with what they are trying to achieve is the end of the war. The Israeli withdrawal from Gaza permanent ceasefire. I would think that it will also might have an effect on Israel. If the number two in Hamas, the mastermind of the October 7 atrocity, uh, invasion is dead. This will play the card for those who claim maybe Israel should continue fighting. Maybe Israel should not negotiate. Maybe Israel should not concede and not agree to the end of this war, permanent ceasefire and withdrawal. And I assume this will heat up the discussion about that inside Israel.
DS: Okay, so let's talk about that, because what could the takeaway be from those among the Israeli decision makers who believe that military pressure on Hamas ultimately forces concessions coming from Hamas? And that the way to actually get Hamas to sort of break down at the negotiating table, some argued they did at the, in late November of last year during the first hostage deal, it was a result of military pressure.
RB: That's what they say.
DS: Right. Okay. So give me your take on what you think is the reality and what, and then what it means now for these negotiations, what do you actually believe it means?
RB: So since the beginning, Israel said it invades Gaza to achieve two goals, and putting them allegedly on the same sort of equivalent line, to release the hostages and destroy, dismantle Hamas, destroy Hamas infrastructure, military forces, etc. And also Israel claimed, Israeli IDFs claimed that the only way to achieve a deal is by exercising more and more force, that only the ground maneuver will bring the hostages. Now, We don't have the time to explain, but the deal that was achieved in November, according to massive realm of sources from different countries and different agencies was not achieved because of using force. This could be achieved before the invasion because Hamas wanted to get, sort of, get rid of the women and children. This was a burden on them.
DS: You mean that Hamas wanted to get rid of the, the women and children hostages because this was a problem. They believe this was a huge problem for Hamas.
RB: Yeah. for them. And they were under great pressure from Qatar and others that they even offered to give them back for very small price before the Israeli ground maneuver. Now, after that ceasefire exploded on the 29th of November, Israel has tried repeatedly to prove that only force, only military strikes, only the use of more and more pressure on Hamas will bring a better deal on the hostages. And none of that proved right. Now you can say that in order to take down Hamas, dismantle Hamas, you need to use more and more force and you will end up not just killing Deif, but killing all the others. Even the IDF, since April, left this slogan of only force will bring the deal. And now they say, no, we need to change the sequence. We need to get the deal first and go back to fighting after. Now, where this is going, it depends on two people at the end. One is Sinwar and one is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. And I don't think the killing of Deif changing this equation this way or the other, it remains in the same place. Sinwar is saying, I have one priority first and foremost, and above everything, this is the permanent ceasefire and a withdrawal of Israeli forces from Gaza. And I put the release of my prisoners, my brothers, those that I swore when I was released in 2010 in the Gilad Shalit deal, I swore to them I will do everything, but now, I put them in the second place because I want a ceasefire. That's my first priority, and prisoners are second. Benjamin Netanyahu is saying the same, but the mirror of this. Benjamin Netanyahu is saying the first priority is the ability to continue the fighting until the total, you call it the total victory, but let's say continue the fighting after, until a total destruction of Hamas. And I put the hostage deal as a second priority. Those two are in conflict. There are three words, three, that are the difference between Hamas and Israel. But the total world between them, and for the time being, I don't see the solution because they're really in striking contradiction to one another.
DS: If Hamas were to acknowledge the death of Deif, I take your point that it's unlikely. In doing so, what kind of response would they have to, would you imagine they would try to orchestrate? Either militarily inside Gaza or try to do something inside Israel, which I get their capacity to do right now is quite constrained because they've been hit so hard in Gaza. So their ability to project force inside Israel is limited at best. I know this is highly speculative, but I got to believe Israeli intelligence is, is pondering this possibility.
RB: Yeah. So I don't want to give Hamas any ideas, but unlike ISIS or, or Al Qaeda, they never said we execute Israeli hostages.
DS: Meaning they've never said that they have. Meaning they say, when Israeli hostages have been killed, they've said it's because of IDF military operations that have killed the hostages. They never say they execute. Whereas ISIS and Al Qaeda did.
RB: Yes, for example, after the operation to rescue four Israeli hostages recently, They said, maybe Israel rescued those four, but during the bombing to divert the attention, they killed other three. And in this way, even if they executed them, they are putting the blame on Israeli forces and they are trying to deter Israeli forces for further operations against them. They have a limited capacity that they reserve for special need to launch remote control rockets at missiles. to central Israel, but very, very, very limited, and they might use it. Or they might ask Hezbollah if Deif is declared shaheed. to launch an attack on primary targets in Israel. But I don't think that Hamas will primarily fundamentally change its, its behavior this way or the other after his death.
DS: Last question. How easy is it to replace someone like Deif?
RB: In the current situation, it's impossible. He is a legend. He was there for almost since the beginning. No one has his capacity. No one has his knowledge. But Hamas, not immediately, but Hamas has shown also that it can adapt. To say that he's replaceable in the coming future, I would say no. To say that with his death comes the death of the military brigade of Hamas, that's a definite no. If everything we know for now comes to be true, and the, this ghost of Mohammad Deif was identified by Israeli intelligence that were able to verify his presence on a scene in a specific minute with one of his lieutenants, chief lieutenants, and able to kill him at that spot, that's a major achievement from the hands of Israeli intelligence, which is basically military intelligence and Shin Bet, and a combined secret unit. If they were able to do that, it's a major achievement. It's, in a way, it's sort of re-institutionalized of their strength and their power that were so badly damaged and their reputation so badly damaged after the failure of October 7th.
DS: That's interesting. I think there have been a number of extraordinary successes by Israeli intelligence since October 7th in Gaza But you think this one is singular in a category of its own relative to all the others.
RB: I think that if this proves to be correct that Mohammed Deif was killed with Rafa Salameh but it's especially about Deif that this is the one most important singular military, but especially intelligence achievement, since the beginning of the war. At the end, this war is also about symbols, and there were two symbols for Hamas. One is called Sinwar, and the other one is called Mohammad Deif. And when the allies went for Berlin, of course they wanted to take down the Third Reich, but they also wanted the head of Adolf Hitler. When Israel went for the war in Lebanon in 1982, it was to dismantle the PLO, but also for personally for the head of Yasser Arafat. When Israel went to the war in Gaza after the October 7 atrocity, they went to dismantle Hamas, but also they went to take out two individuals. One is SInwar and the other one is Deif. And so this is a major achievement that needed very precise intelligence online, the ability to identify one person in one location at a very specific second and drop a bomb on his head. If proved to be correct, that's a pretty significant achievement.
DS: Okay, Ronen, thank you for making the time, especially on the short notice. This was very helpful and we will be, I'm sure, coming back to you soon as more details are made public. Until then, thanks again and stay safe.
RB: Thank you, Dan.
DS: That's our show for today. To keep up with Ronen Bergman, you can find him on X @ronenbergman and you can also find him at Ynet and at Yidioth. Call Me Back is produced and edited by Ilan Benatar. Our media manager is Rebecca Strom. Additional editing by Martin Huergo. Until next time, I'm your host, Dan Senor.